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INTRODUCTION
A criminal act ordinarily involves two parties: a perpetrator and
a victim. Criminal law scholarship in general, and economic analysis
in particular, traditionally endorse a perpetrator-centered perspec-
tive. Under this perspective, all factors relevant to the design of
criminal norms emanate from attributes of actual or potential
perpetrators of crime. Justifications for punishment and the severity
of punishment are based exclusively upon characteristics of the
criminal's behavior or mental state. The victim's role is confined to
the suffering of harm, while his conduct prior to the crime is
generally of no normative concern.'
This Article challenges the perpetrator-centered perspective and
proposes a complementary perspective-a victim-centered one. The
Article argues that the perpetrator-centered perspective is too narrow
because it overlooks the important role that victims have in pre-crime
settings. In particular, it neglects the victims' role in taking
precautions and protecting themselves against crime, a neglect which
leads to a socially undesirable investment in precautionary
measures.2 By approaching criminal law from a victim-centered per-
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For introductory presentations of the economic analysis of the criminal law that
exemplify the perpetrator-centered perspective, see generally ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 506-84 (1988); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-86 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 223-47 (4th ed. 1992).
2 Previous studies have examined the victims' decisionmaking process in investing
in precautions and have exposed some of the reasons for the inefficiencies in these
investments. SeeRobert Barr & Ken Pease, CimePlacement, Displacement, and Deflection,
in 12 CRIME AND JUsTIcE 277, 289-91 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990)
(discussing the concept of "malign displacement," which describes situations where
the prevention of certain crimes results in the commission of crimes that are more
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spective, this Article aims to facilitate a systematic study of victims'
incentives to engage in precautions against crime and of the way
criminal law norms shape these incentives.'
The normative premise this Article embraces is that of efficiency.
It views crime as a social cost that consists of the cost of harm to
victims, the cost of precautions against harm taken by victims, and
serious); Ronald V. Clarke, Introduction to SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 3, 22-27
(Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1992) [hereinafter Clarke, Introduction] (contrasting the
dispositional approach to that of the rational-choice approach in analyzing criminal
displacement theory); Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical
Basis and Practical Scope, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE 225, 245-47 (Michael Tonry & Norval
Morris eds., 1983) [hereinafter Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention] (discussing the
threat that displacement poses to situational crime prevention measures); Charles T.
Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5J. URB. ECON. 388, 398 (1978) (stating
that protective measures "may result in an inefficient allocation of resources"); Philip
J. Cook, TheDemand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 22-
24 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986) (noting that "[s]ome types of self-
protection may pose a hazard to the community"); Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V.
Clarke, Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory, 25
CRIMINOLOGY933 (1987) (invoking a framework ofcriminals' rational decisionmaking
to study the theory of crime displacement); David deMeza &J.R. Gould, The Social
Efficiency of Pivate Decisions to Enforce Property Rights, 100J. POL. ECON. 561, 579 (1992)
(analyzing the effects of externalities arising from private enforcement of property
rights); David Friedman, Efficient Institutions for the Prvate Enforcement of Law, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 395-96 (1984) (proposing methods to promote a socially efficient
system of private law enforcement); Koo Hui-Wen & I.P.L. Png, Private Security:
Deterrent orDiversion., 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (1994) (discussing whether private
security expenditures deter crime or merely divert it); Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime
Prevention and theDisplacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 166 (1976) (examining
the argument that crime prevention programs stressing "opportunity reduction"
merely displace crime); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private
Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123, 126 (1991) (stating that
individuals' chosen levels of precaution are not necessarily socially optimal levels of
precaution). This literature, however, does not offer a victim-centered perspective of
criminal law since it does not address the effects of criminal law norms on victims'
investments in precautions.
I The victim-centered perspective of criminal law restores a symmetry between
criminal law and other fields of law. Contract law issues directives to victims of
breached contracts as well as to those who have committed such breaches. See infra
note 102 and accompanying text. Tort law scrutinizes the behavior of alleged victims
of tort as well as that of alleged torffeasors in order to determine liability. See infra
text accompanying note 103. It has long been understood that different models,
studying various areas of law, share a common approach: they focus equally on the
behavior of the "passive parties" as on the behavior of the "active parties." SeeRobert
C. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Propery: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1, 44 (1985) (concluding that throughout various areas of law efficiency requires a
consideration of the behaviors of both the injurer and the injured). Criminal law has
not been commonly understood to fit this unified view. In this sense, the victim-
centered perspective that this Article advances unifies our understanding of criminal
law with that of other areas of common law.
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the government's enforcement cost.4  Inasmuch as criminal law
norms are aimed at reducing these costs, studying victims' incentives
to take precautions becomes analytically important and economically
worthwhile.' This normative premise, however, can be dropped
without undermining our main positive claim, namely that crime
victims' investments in precautions are affected by criminal law.
Thus, if society cares about victims' precautions for reasons other
than efficiency, it can use criminal law to influence victims' behavior
in a manner deemed desirable.
The victim-centered perspective not only enriches the abstract
understanding of criminal law, but also provides an explanation for
various existing criminal law doctrines. Doctrines that are ordinarily
understood as aimed at influencing perpetrators of crime can now be
explained by additional rationales stemming from the incentive
effects on potential victims. This Article will demonstrate the
usefulness of the victim-centered perspective by applying it to one of
the most intractable doctrines in criminal law-the treatment of
criminal attempt.
The main insight that runs through the victim-centered perspec-
tive is the following: Criminal law norms can induce victims to take
efficient levels of precaution by graduating the sanctions imposed
upon criminals in accordance with the behavior of their victims. In
particular, if a victim takes the efficient level of precaution, her
offender will be penalized by a "high" sanction. If a victim takes an
inefficient level of precaution, her offender will be penalized by a
"low" sanction. The different sanctions will lead to different
deterrence: rationally calculating criminals will have an added
incentive to target victims who have taken inefficient levels of
precaution. Consequently, victims will have an incentive to take the
efficient level of precaution.
' See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL.
ECON. 169, 170-85 (1968) (discussing the economic costs of crime and the optimal
amount of enforcement).
5 A recent study estimates private expenditures against crime in the United States
at about $300 billion annually. See Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Epidemiology of Crimre, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405, 407 & n.6 (1996) (applying
insights from epidemiology to understand criminal activity and the effects of victims'
precautions). Another study finds that in the United States potential victims spent
more than $160 billion in 1985 alone to physically protect their property. See David
N. Laband &John P. Sophocleus, An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on TransferActivity
in the United States, 107 Qj. ECON. 959, 962-64 (1992) (estimating, among other things,
the social cost of crime prevention).
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Our previous work has already pointed out some of the ways in
which criminal law influences victims' behavior.6 This Article adds
to the study of victims' incentives in two primary aspects. First, it
draws a distinction between local and global incentive schemes.
Previous work has focused exclusively on local incentives, that is,
incentives that encourage or discourage the use of certain specific
precautions.7 In contrast, this Article points out the importance of
using global incentives-incentives that influence the aggregate
investment by victims in precautions, regardless of the crime against
which they protect themselves or the measures they use. Most
importantly, this Article will illustrate that entrenched doctrines of
criminal law, in particular the treatment of criminal attempt, provide
global incentives for potential victims to change their investment in
precautions.
Another way in which this Article extends previous work is its
emphasis on the direction of the distortion in victims' behavior. In
some previous work, it was assumed that the law needs to induce
victims to increase their investment in precautions, which would
otherwise be too small. This Article takes a more comprehensive
look at victims' investment in precautions. It exposes several factors
that distort the incentives and suggests that the main concern should
be victims' overinvestment in precautions. Thus, it argues that
criminal law needs to induce victims to reduce their investment in
precautions. The doctrine of attempts, it shows, is an incentive
mechanism that leads victims to reduce their investment in precau-
tions.
Part I examines the pervasiveness of the perpetrator-centered
perspective in the existing law and economics scholarship. It argues
that the exclusive focus on the incentives for criminals is incompati-
ble with the Welfare-enhancing goals of criminal law. Designing
6 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for
Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORc. 434, 434-37 (1995) (arguing
that "contibutory fault" is used within the criminal law to provide incentives for victims
to act in more socially desirable ways); Alon Harel, Effiwiency and Fairness in Criminal
Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181,
1182 (1994) (noting that several criminal law doctrines are "aimed at influencing the
behavior of potential victims of crime").
I See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
8 See Harel, supra note 6, at 1183 (arguing that a criminal law principle of
comparative fault would provide victims with incentives to take precautions against
criminal acts). But see Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6, at 434-37 (dropping the
assumption of victims' underinvestment in precautions, and focusing the analysis on
one factor that may lead to an overinvestment in precautions).
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deterrent measures aimed at criminals is one, but not the only
manner in which costs of crime can be curbed. Since victims'
investment in precautions is a significant component of the social
cost of crime, it is also important to understand what shapes victims'
incentives to invest. Part II then analyzes the incentives influencing
potential victims. It concludes that there are conflicting forces, and
that such conflict may sometimes lead to overinvestment in precau-
tions, and at other times, to underinvestment.
Part III articulates the fundamental proposition of the analysis.
It demonstrates how criminal law norms provide incentives for
potential victims to engage in precautions. By understanding how
these incentives are affected, Part III develops a mechanism that
provides optimal incentives.
Part IV explores how traditional doctrines in criminal law, in
particular the law of attempts, can be reinterpreted as mechanisms
that provide potential victims with incentives to take optimal
precautions against crime. It surveys the main, current debates
regarding the doctrine of attempts within traditional scholarship and
within law and economics. Part IV then addresses one of the most
difficult questions that arises in these debates-why do many legal
systems treat attempts more leniently than completed crimes?
Specifically, why does this leniency exist in situations in which the
attempt failed to become a completed crime due to factors beyond
the perpetrator's control? In addition, this Part addresses the
problem of why a person who engages in mere preparation of a
crime is exempted from criminal liability. What are the factors that
determine the boundaries between nonpunishable preparation and
punishable attempt? In applying the victim-centered perspective to
the analysis of criminal attempts, a new justification is developed for
the pervasive practice that treats pre-crime activity, such as prepara-
tion and attempt, more leniently than completed crimes.
I. THE DOMINANCE OF THE PERPETRATOR-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE
Traditional theories of punishment view criminal sanctions
exclusively from a perpetrator-centered perspective. A brief sketch
of the traditional justifications for criminal sanctions can support this
observation. Textbooks of criminal law often state four theories
concerning the major functions of punishment: deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation and reformation (or rehabilitation).' All
9 See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 297-309 (2d ed.
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of these theories focus exclusively on the actual or potential criminal.
Deterrence (either general or specific) is understood as the effort to
prevent a potential criminal from committing crimes in the future."0
Retributive theories, on the other hand, are interested in inflicting
suffering on the actual criminal who, under these theories, deserves
to be punished." Incapacitation focuses on the criminal who
cannot be deterred and, hence, should have his libery restricted.
Finally, rehabilitation theories study how to reform criminals and
return them to society. 2 Under all of these theories, criminal law
focuses on the acts or mental states of criminals (either potential or
actual) and regards victims' behaviors or mental states as irrelevant
to the concerns of criminal law.
Economic analysis of criminal law joins the general trend of a
perpetrator-based perspective. Starting with Gary Becker,"3 who
developed the modern economic model of criminal law, attention
has been exclusively devoted to the optimal design of incentives for
criminals. In Becker's original analysis, as in many studies that
followed, 4 the focus was on the optimal tradeoff between the
1960) (outlining the general justifications for criminal punishments).
10 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 70-90 (1973) (detailing the definitions of terms
centrally relevant to deterrence theory).
11 For a good discussion of different theories of retributive justice, see R.A. DUFF,
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 187-204 (1986) (describing views that posit retribution as
thejustification for criminal punishment); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT:
APHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 88-65 (1987) (surveying critically several retributivist
theories).
12 For new attempts to defend rehabilitation theories, see, e.g., DUFF, supra note
11, at 233-66 (portraying punishment as a means to secure the criminal's repentance
for his wrongdoing) ;Jean Hampton, The MoralEducation Theoy ofPunishmen4 13 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 208, 221-28 (1984) (arguing for a moral education theory of punish-
ment). Admittedly, there are theories of punishment that cannot be easily categorized
under these four headings. Such theories, however, have not been influential in legal
circles. The most prominent of these theories is the expressive theory of punishment,
which regards punishment as expressing societal condemnation of criminal behavior.
See DUFF, supra note 11, at 235-39 (stating that punishment expresses condemnation
and disapproval of the criminal act); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 71 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994)
(depicting punishment as an expression of disapproval and condemnation). The
expressive theory, however, is not exempted from the deficiencies of the other
theories. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that it focuses solely on the criminal
and neglects the role of the victim.
11 See Becker, supra note 4, at 170-85 (discussing the economic cost of crime and
the optimal amount of enforcement).
14 See generallyJames Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines:
Should thePenalty Fit the Cime?, 22 RANDJ. OF ECON. 385 (1991) (reexamining models
of the enforcement-compliance relationship and concluding that in ajudicial system
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magnitude of sanctions and the probability of apprehending the
criminal. These analyses concentrated on the most efficient means
by which society can deter criminals from committing harmful acts.
In this entire branch of literature, victims' roles were limited to the
suffering of harm; monitoring victims' behavior was not considered
a policy objective. 5
premised on a "reasonable doubt" standard, increased penalties reduce probabilities
of conviction); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals
Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365
(1992) (reconsidering levels of optimal sanctions in cases involving perpetrators'
uncertainty of the probability of capture); Louis Kaplow, OptimalDeterrence, Uninformed
Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990) (examining levels of optimal enforcement in cases involving
legal uncertainties in the acts committed); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and
Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3
(1992) (examining the optimal measures of enforcement when the optimal level of
crime is known to be zero); Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum
Enforcement 21 RANDJ. OF ECON. 841 (1990) (suggesting that high sanctions may lead
to excessive efforts toward detection avoidance); Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png,
Monitoring vis-e-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556 (1992)
(suggesting a varied investigation rate and maximal fines to optimally deter larger
offenses); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal
Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1992) (examining how
enforcement costs affect optimal degrees of enforcement effort and optimal
magnitude of sanctions, and concluding that certain enforcement costs, including
costs of investigation and prosecution, should be included in imposing fines); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among
Individuals, 81 AMi. ECON. REv. 618 (1991) (concluding that optimal deterrence is
achieved when fines are less than the entire wealth of most individuals); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of
Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1979) (reexamining Becker's model under the
assumption of risk-aversion); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use
of Fines and Imprisonmen4 24J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984) (concluding that maximal fines
should be imposed before a sanction is supplemented with imprisonment); Steven
Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991)
[hereinafter Shavell, Specific Versus General] (suggesting thatwhere enforcement efforts
are general, optimal sanctions rise in proportion to the harmfulness of acts); George
J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970) (suggesting
that imposing maximal sanctions for all crimes undermines "marginal deterrence,"
i.e., eliminating the incentive of an individual who commits one crime to refrain from
committing another, more serious crime). For a recent survey of the economic
literature on criminal law enforcement, see Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law
Enforcement; 10J. ECON. SURV. (forthcoming 1997).
15 A typical model belonging to this literature would have a "population" of
potential criminals who are rational calculators, and who stand to gain a benefit ("b")
if they commit the harmful act. Their act imposes a harm ("h") on the victim and on
society. Society can invest a cost of "x" in detecting criminals, to bring the probability
of detection to p(x). If caught, the criminal is punished by a sanction ("s"). Thus,
a risk-neutral individual would commit the act if and only if b > p(x) x s. Becker
demonstrated that any given enforcement policy can be improved simply by increasing
1996]
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Posner and Shavell each have extended the Becker-type analysis
to study a broader set of issues relating to criminal enforcement.
Posner posited that criminal sanctions should be designed to
generate deterrence where tort liability and monetary "fines" are
ineffective (due to the actor's solvency problems, or to the inherently
low probability of detection).16 Shavell studied the optimal use of
nonmonetary sanctions-ones that are costly for society to adminis-
ter. 7 Both Posner and Shavell used their theories to rationalize
various criminal doctrines, including intent, attempt, causation,
conspiracy and defenses. In doing so, they have continued the trend
of focusing exclusively on criminals as the only parties whose
behavior should be monitored.
Lately, economists have devoted increasing attention to the
incentives operating upon potential victims."8 Recognizing that
victims' investments in precautions are a significant economic
activity, estimated by some to cost hundreds of billions of dollars
each year,'9 economists examine whether this investment is exces-
sive. These studies advance the understanding of victims' incentives
and highlight the divergence between the good of individual victims
the sanctions and reducing the probability of detection by the same proportion. See
Becker, supra note 4, at 170-85. Deterrence would remain unchanged, while some
costs of detection would be saved. If Becker's logic is followed to an extreme, itwould
prescribe the administration of maximal sanctions, coupled with very low probabilities
of detection. The literature that followed Becker, some of which is referred to in note
14, supra, tried to reexamine Becker's model under more complex assumptions, and
to determine when low sanctions would be desirable. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 14,
at 527.
16 See Richard A. Posner, AnEconomic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1985) (noting that not all "market bypassing [can] be deterred by tort
law").
11 See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as
aDeterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1241-42, 1246 (1985) (recognizing how the nature
of the court's information can explain the optimal levels of sanctions).
1s See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from
Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack 5-10 (Aug. 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law School) (examining the distorted
incentives to install the Lojack car antitheft device); Hui-Wen & Png, supra note 2, at
95-97 (examining whether victims' precautions deter or merely divert crime); Keith
N. Hylton, OptimalLawEnforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RANDJ. ECON. 197 (1996)
(showing how optimal enforcement changes when victim precautions are taken into
account); Shavell, supra note 2, at 123 (examining the individual or collective motives
of private individuals to protect their property from theft).
11 SeeLaband & Sophocleus, supra note 5, at 962-63; Philipson & Posner, supranote
5, at 407 & n.6. The former estimates that victims spend more than $160 billion
annually on merely protecting the physical access to their property, and the latter
estimates that up to $300 billion are spent annually on crime-reducing activities.
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and the good of society. What these studies do not do, however, is
point out the connection between the criminal law and victims'
investments in precautions against crime.20
In sum, economists have addressed both criminal law and
victims' investment in precautions, but they have failed to explore
the relationship between the two. Economists who devoted their
attention to criminal law ignored its effects on victims.2" Econo-
mists who devoted their attention to victims' behavior-in particular,
to their investment in precautions-failed to explore how criminal
law influences that behavior.22 Thus, despite economists' explicit
urgings to reconsider and challenge traditional justifications for
criminal law norms, economists have widely endorsed a perpetrator-
centered perspective-the very same perspective that characterizes
the more traditional scholarship of criminal law.
This conclusion is surprising for two reasons. First, there is an
important sense in which the perpetrator-centered perspective
endorsed by Becker, Posner, Shavell and others is incompatible with
the fundamental presuppositions of their own theories. Efficiency
considerations dictate that criminal law should minimize the total
costs of crime to society, defined as the sum of the expected costs of
crime and the costs of precautionary measures against crime.2" If
the fundamental objective of criminal law is to minimize the costs of
crime as defined above, criminal law norms should be evaluated with
respect to their effect on the incentives operating upon potential
victims to take efficient precautions.
Second, the emergence of economic analysis as an independent
school of thought is often attributed to Ronald Coase, through his
article The Problem of Social Cost.24  One of the most influential
insights of Coase's article is the attention it draws to the incentives
operating upon potential victims of torts to invest in precautionary
measures and the manner in which these incentives can be manipu-
20 One area of victim activity that has produced many studies is carrying concealed
handguns. Estimates of the frequency of defensive use of guns range from 80,000 to
2.5 million occurrences each year. See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance
to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 150, 153, 180-82 (1995) (surveying the prevalence of defensive uses of
guns each year).
21 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
' See Becker, supra note 4, at 200, 207; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 536-39.
24 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (illustrating the law's irrelevance to the attainment of
efficiency, and suggesting that fundamental legal distinctions are economically
insignificant).
1996]
308 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145:299
lated through tortfeasors' liability.2 Why has this insight not been
imported from the economic analysis of tort law into the economic
analysis of criminal law?
Three arguments can perhaps justify this failure on the part of
economists to explore the manner in which criminal law influences
victims' behavior. The first is a division of labor argument. Under
this argument, criminal law is a means of providing incentives for
criminals. Arguably, other mechanisms are better suited to provide
incentives for potential victims to take efficient precautions against
crime. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to explore
systematically alternative mechanisms by which potential victims can
be induced to invest efficiently in precautions. 6
The second argument questions whether criminal law can
significantly influence the incentives of potential victims to take
precautions against crime. Criminal law imposes sanctions on
criminals and hence primarily influences the incentives operating
upon criminals. Part III will contest this argument and demonstrate
that criminal law inevitably provides some incentives for potential
victims to invest in precautions and that it is therefore important to
adopt rules that provide victims with incentives to invest efficiently
in precautions.
The third argument endorses the view that victims' incentives to
take precautions against crime are optimal under the current system
and, therefore, that there is no need to tinker with these incentives.
Arguably, victims of crime bear the full expected costs of the crime
directed against them. Consequently, they have adequate incentives
to take optimal precautions. If these incentives are optimal, any
attempt to influence potential victims will distort the efficient
incentives that already operate under the current system. The
following Part will explore the incentives operating on potential
victims and expose the distortions in these incentives. It will
conclude that, given these distortions, and absent a corrective
mechanism, victims' investments in precautions are likely to be
inefficient.
See also John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323, 348-49 (1973) (using economic analysis to compare the social efficiencies
of different tort liability rules).
26 This neglect is evident in light of the extensive literature on victims' incentives
in other areas of law. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 3, at 3 (positing a model of
precaution that highlights the fundamental role of victims in reducing the costs of
interfering activities).
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II. THE DISTORTED INCENTIVES OF POTENTIAL CRIME VICTIMS
Potential victims take precautions to reduce the costs of crime
they bear. In situations in which potential victims bear the full
expected costs of crimes directed against them and the full cost of
their own precautions, we can expect their investment in precautions
to be optimal. In such situations, any attempt to induce potential
victims to change their investment in precautions will lead to
inefficiencies. If, however, victims' precautions generate external
effects such that the well-being of other individuals is affected, then
we can predict that victims' investment in precautions will not be
optimal. The discussion below examines several external effects that
victims' precautions may have. First, we look at factors that may lead
to overinvestment in precautions, and then, we consider factors that
may lead to underinvestment in precautions.
A. Overinvestment in Precautions
Victims may overinvest in precautions when those precautions
generate negative externalities, i.e., if there are costs that they do not
bear that arise from their precautions. The following are examples
of when precautions might impose external costs.
1. Crime Diversion
One factor that may lead to excessive investment in precautions,
and which has gained much attention in the literature, is the
diversion or displacement of crime. Often, precautions are
27 See, e.g., Barr & Pease, supra note 2, at 283-93 (examining "how displacement or
deflection of crime can be used to achieve [an equitable] spread of crime"); Clarke,
Introduction, supra note 2, at 22-25 (noting that "displacement is always a danger, but
is rarely if ever complete"); Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, supra note 2, at 227,
245-47 (describing "the range of displacement effects that have been observed and
hypothesized" and reviewing "selected research findings on whether, when and to
what extent displacement occurs"); Clotfelter, supra note 2, at 398 (arguing that
"protective measures which have the effect of diverting crime from one household to
others constitute a class of externalities which may result in an inefficient allocation
of resources"); Cook, supra note 2, at 1, 14-19 (discussing the relationship between
opportunities for crime and the aggregate amount of crime); Cornish & Clarke, supra
note 2 (invoking a framework of criminals' rational decisionmaking to study the
theory of crime displacement); Hui-Wen & Png, supra note 2, at 94 ("[A]dditional
security expenditures by one victim surely will divert criminals to the other.");
Reppetto, supra note 2, at 166 (arguing that "there are definite limits to various
displacement possibilities" and that "the displacement potential of an anticrime
strategy can be gauged in advance and, in certain instances, be minimized"); Shavell,
supra note 2 (considering the theft reduction effect plus the diversion effect if
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successful in preventing harm to the victim that installed them, yet
at the same time divert the criminal toward acting against other, less
protected, victims. If, for example, a potential victim builds an
impenetrable fence around his house, a theft that would otherwise
have occurred at his house may now occur at a neighboring estate.
Similarly, if a car owner installs a sophisticated antitheft device, the
car thief may find his victim farther down the street. Whenever
precautions lead merely to crime diversion, they have no social value
since they do not reduce the social cost of crime. Thus, society
would prefer that these precautions were not used. But since these
diverting precautions have a private value to their users, they will in
fact be utilized. Hence, the actual private use of these precautions
exceeds the socially optimal level: crime diversion leads to excessive
precautions.
2. Criminals' Benefit
There is an ongoing debate as to whether criminals' benefit from
crime ought to be included in the social welfare calculus at all,
namely, whether society is considered better off if, other things being
equal, its criminals are wealthier.2 8 Put differently, if one considers
theft to be a mere transfer of wealth, from the victim to the criminal,
one is implicitly including the criminals' benefit as an element of
social welfare. Hence, if we put some positive value on criminals'
benefit, even if this value is discounted significantly, we are faced
with the concern that criminals' benefits will be deprived by victims'
overinvestment in precautions. If criminals' benefit from crime is
precautions are observable or unobservable). For a discussion of this phenomenon
in the context of the right to carry handguns, see Daniel D. Polsby, Firearms Costs,
Firearms Benefits and the Limits of Knowledge 86J. (RIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207, 207-220
(1995) (questioning whether carrying firearms reduces the threat of homicide or
merely diverts it).
21 Becker suggested originally that criminals' benefit should be counted as part of
social welfare. See Becker, supra note 4, at 173 (including the gain to offenders when
calculating the total harm to society from crime). In a famous response, George
Stigler argued the contrary. See Stigler, supra note 14, at 527-28 (asking "what
evidence is there that society sets a positive value upon the utility derived from
murder, rape, or arson"). For a survey of law and economics writers' positions in this
debate, as well as for arguments why criminals' benefits should not count, see Jeff L.
Lewin & William N. Trumbull, The Social Value of Crime., 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
271, 278 (1990) ("Treating criminal gains as a contribution to social welfare ignores
the reality that certain acts.., are expressly prohibited by criminal legislation."), and
the response by Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13
INT'L REV. OF L. & EcON. 225, 228-29 (1993) (criticizing Lewin and Trumbull's
arguments as economically unconvincing).
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part of social welfare, then victims' precautions that reduce criminals'
benefits reduce social welfare. With greater precautions, a successful
crime becomes harder to accomplish, and the benefit that criminals
gain from it is less often realized.
3. Harm from Precautions
Often, victims' precautions involve hazardous activities that, aside
from preventing the completion of the crime, may also harm either
other potential victims or the criminals themselves. For example,
potential victims who carry defensive weapons occasionally use them
inaccurately, harming other victims or the criminals unnecessarily. 9
Alternatively, home and car alarms that are set off inadvertently may
cause noise nuisances that harm neighbors. As these costs are not
borne entirely by the victims who employ the precautions, victims
have the tendency to utilize them excessively.
B. Underinvestment in Precautions
If the precautions generate positive externalities, i.e., if there are
certain benefits that would arise from using precautions which
victims do not appropriate, then victims will tend to underinvest in
those precautions. Two such external benefits are deterrence as a
public good and prevention of future harms.
1. Deterrence as a Public Good
Some precautions have a "public good" aspect: once installed,
they benefit other victims as well."0 Take, for example, a streetlight
that a homeowner installs in front of her house to deter burglars.
Other homeowners whose gates are illuminated by the light benefit
from it without bearing its cost. Similarly, the precautionary
' See Philip J. Cook, The Role of Firearms in V olent Crime: An Interpretive Review of
the Literature, in CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 236 (Marvin E. Wolfgang & Neil Alan Weiner
eds., 1982) (suggesting that many deaths can be eliminated by keeping guns out of
the possession of potential victims).
11 Public goods are characterized by two features: 1)jointness of supply and 2) the
impossibility or inefficiency of exclusion. Jointness connotes that the consumption
of the public good by one person does not detract from the benefits enjoyed by
others. The impossibility or inefficiency of exclusion means that consumers cannot
easily be excluded from enjoying or benefitting from the public good. For a more
detailed definition of public goods, see JOSEPH STIGLiTZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 119-23 (2d ed. 1988) (claiming the two features of public goods to be the
nondesirability of rationing and the nonfeasibility of rationing).
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measures that stockholders in a corporation take to prevent
embezzlement by corporate officials benefit all other stockholders.
The social gain from these types of precautions exceeds the private
gain to the victims who implement them, implying that some socially
valuable measures will not be applied."1
2. Prevention of Future Harms
Victims' precautions may yield benefits distinct from the
immediate benefit for which they were intended. If detection
measures (e.g., closed-circuit cameras) lead to the apprehension and
incapacitation of criminals, future potential victims of these appre-
hended criminals benefit. Likewise, if the failure to succeed in crime
leads some criminals to turn to legal activities, the precautions that
led to this failure benefit future potential victims. But since the
victims that choose these precautions do not appropriate their entire
future benefit, underinvestment in precautions occurs.
Hence, there are various factors that may distort victims'
incentives to take precautionary actions. Some precautions may be
used excessively, while others may be used suboptimally. Empirical
examination may determine which activity is subject to which type of
distortion. For the purpose of this discussion, it suffices to conclude
that, in general, we cannot expect victims to engage in optimal
precautions. Later in the analysis, we will offer some conjectures
regarding the actual direction of the distortion, whether it is towards
over- or underinvestment 2 But first let us begin by proposing a
general analytical solution to the inefficiency-a solution that applies
independently of the direction of the distortion.
S This phenomenon has been noted by criminologists as well as by economists.
SeeAyres & Levitt, supra note 18, at 30-31 (demonstrating that the Lojack car antitheft
device is currently underutilized, in part due to the fact that consumers using the
device obtain less than 10% of the total social benefit produced by it); Clarke,
Introduction, supra note 2, at 25-26 (describing the "diffusion of benefits" that occurs
when anticrime measures in one arena provide benefits in others); Terance D.
Miethe, Citizen-Based Crime Control Activity and Victimization Risks: An Examination of
Displacement and Free-Rider Effects, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 419, 422 (1991) (discussing the
"free-rider" effect for residents who do not take significant precautions against crime);
Shavell, supra note 2, at 124-26 (comparing the "potential victims' collectively optimal
level of precaution" to the level of precaution taken by just one individual).
32 See infra Part IV.D.1.
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III. How CAN VICTIMS' INCENTIVES BE CHANGED THROUGH
CRIMINAL LAW?
A. Providing Victims' Incentives Through Criminal Law
As explained above, potential victims may sometimes take
excessive precautions, and other times engage in too few precautions.
This Part will explore the means by which criminal law can simulta-
neously provide incentives for those victims who invest too much in
precautions to reduce their investment and for those who invest too
little to increase their investment.
Demonstrating how criminal law provides incentives for victims
requires a two-stage analysis. At the first stage, we will show that
criminal law can influence the manner in which perpetrators of
crime choose their victims. At the second stage, we will show that the
shift in the way in which perpetrators select their victims-a shift
which can be induced by criminal law norms-in turn influences the
investment of potential victims of crime in precautionary measures.
Criminal law can influence the manner in which criminals select
their victims by graduating the sanctions imposed upon criminals in
accordance with their victims' behavior. Harsher sanctions would be
imposed on criminals who target victims who had taken optimal
precautions. This system would deter criminals from targeting such
victims and, consequently, would lead victims to take optimal
precautions. To illustrate how this mechanism would work, consider
the following example. Assume a society consisting of two types of
potential victims, type A and type B. Type A victims engage in
optimal precautions, while type B victims take an inefficient amount
of precautions. Criminal law norms can impose harsher sanctions on
criminals who target type A victims than on criminals who target type
B victims. Such a rule encourages rationally calculating criminals to
shift from type A victims to type B victims and consequently imposes
larger expected costs on type B victims." The increased risks borne
by type B victims will, in turn, induce potential victims to behave in
the desired manner and thus enjoy the increased protection enjoyed
-- This result could also be achieved if, instead of raising the sanctions imposed
upon criminals who select type A victims, society were to increase its enforcement
efforts in a way that raises the probability that criminals who direct their crime against
type A victims will be caught and punished. In order to manipulate the manner by
which criminals select their victims, one needs to differentiate the expetedpunishment
across victims, i.e., the magnitude of the sanction multiplied by the probability of
being apprehended and convicted.
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by type A victims. Criminal law can thus induce potential victims to
engage in an efficient amount of precautions by manipulating
criminals' punishment.
Provided certain premises are satisfied, this result applies to a
broader set of victims' behaviors, some even outside the context of
precautionary activity. Theoretically, criminal law can provide
incentives to potential victims to respect their neighbors, contribute
to charitable organizations, or pay their taxes, simply by imposing
harsher sanctions on criminals who target victims who conform with
these norms. The broad spectrum of desirable behaviors which,
theoretically, can be reinforced through this mechanism raises
difficult moral questions regarding the proper role of criminal law in
regulating society.34 This Part will focus exclusively on one type of
behavior that the law wishes to encourage, namely efficient invest-
ment in precautions against crime.
The diverse and conflicting incentives operating on potential
victims lead some to invest too much in precautions and others to
invest too little. The legal system should provide potential victims
with incentives in order to effectuate a larger investment in precau-
tions on the part of those who invest too little, as well as a smaller
investment in precautions on the part of those who invest too much.
It is our goal to show that proper incentives can be provided to
potential victims, which will promote desirable behavior even when
the directions of the distortions vary-that is, when victims tend to
engage in both too low or too high a level of precaution.
Let us change our example and assume that there are now three
classes of victims: type A victims who still invest optimally in precau-
tions, type B victims who invest more than efficiency requires and
type C victims who invest less than efficiency requires. Criminal law
can simultaneously induce type B victims and type C victims to invest
optimally as well as preserve the incentives operating on type A
victims to invest optimally. Lower penalties meted out to criminals
who direct their activity against types B and C victims will induce
criminals to target victims of types B and C. This will induce type B
and type C victims to modify their investment in precautions in
accordance with efficiency. At the same time, the higher penalties
that protect type A victims reinforce their choice of optimal behavior.
4 We are grateful to Scott Altman for first raising this objection. For a detailed
discussion, see infra Part IV.D.4.c.
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This reasoning is premised on two implicit assumptions that need
to be established. First, precautions can influence the victim-
selection by criminals only when victims' precautions can be observed
by criminals in advance. Nonobservable precautions cannot affect
criminals' behavior and consequently cannot influence victims'
investments in precautions. 5 Second, it may seem that criminals'
behavior can influence victims' investments in precautions only if
potential victims understand and anticipate the patterns of criminals'
decisionmaking and, in particular, the considerations influencing
criminals' decisions to target one victim rather than another. Let us
examine these premises and the degree to which they can be
satisfied.
Most precautions taken by victims are visible and can be detected
by criminals. The use of locks, bars, steel doors and many other
conventional precautions are visible and thus can influence the way
in which criminals select their victims. Even when precautions are
not visible, victims often notify potential criminals of the existence
of the precautions. 6 A successful crime requires a thorough
investigation of the precautions potential victims take. It is reason-
able, therefore, to presume that criminals invest resources in
identifying victims' precautions prior to the crime.3
7
It is more difficult to establish the second presupposition, namely
that potential victims anticipate the considerations influencing
criminals' selections of victims. Fortunately, such a presupposition
is not required for the purposes of this Article. One need not
assume that potential victims know how criminals select their victims
in order to establish the claim that potential victims behave as if they
had such knowledge. We believe that this latter proposition can be
established.
Potential victims are likely to know the efficacy of precautions
against crime. In particular, they will inquire as to how often
35 SeeBen-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6, at 451-53 ("If criminals cannot observe the
victim's conduct, they cannot distinguish between [a victim who takes precautions and
one who does not] .... In this case, the victim may not be led to comply since
compliance does not affect the incentives of criminals.").
36 This practice raises interesting issues regarding the credibility of such notices.
See id. at 451-52 ("The victim... [may] simulate protection measures without actually
applying them.").
37 There is some evidence, for example, that burglars expend effort "casing" a
house to evaluate its protection and ensure that no one is home. SeeJAMES D. WRIGHT
& PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND
THEIR FIREARMS 140 (1986) (noting that "most burglaries occur when the homes in
question are unoccupied").
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potential victims who use a particular precaution are victimized. If
criminals are less likely to target potential victims who invest
efficiently in precautions, those victims will be less prone to victimiza-
tion and, consequently, other potential victims will be induced to
invest efficiently. Potential victims need not understand the precise
mechanisms that operate here; in particular, they need not under-
stand that a low rate of victimization should be attributed to the
incentives provided by criminal law. All that is assumed is that
victims do not make systematic errors in understanding and learning
from the experience of others." Hence, a system that differentiates
criminals' punishments according to their victims' precautions can
induce optimal precautions even if victims do not fully comprehend
the manner in which the system operates.
If the two presuppositions underlying this argument are sound,
victims' investments in precautions can be manipulated by providing
incentives to criminals to shift from victims who invest efficiently in
precautions to victims who invest too much or too little in precau-
tions. Criminals will react to these incentives accordingly and
potential victims will adjust their investment in precautions to
conform with the dictates of efficiency.
B. Global Versus Local Incentives
Once the mechanisms for providing incentives to potential
victims are clarified, one can classify these incentives into two major
types, global and local incentives. Global incentives affect and alter
indiscriminately the incentives of potential victims to invest in
precautions. Local incentives, on the other hand, are designed to
encourage or discourage potential victims from taking specific
precautions.
1s This assumption resembles the assumption of rational expectations in economic
models. The concept of rational expectations implies that, in the long term,
individuals do not make forecasting errors and do not base their behavior upon
consistently misguided beliefs. Their assessment of the information is no worse than
the assessment that can be made by the economist who studies the model. Either by
learning, evolution, or the inherent laws of statistics, individuals' assessments are
assumed to be correct, on average. SeeThomas Sargent, RationalExpectations, in4 THE
NEW PALGRAvE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 76 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987)
(describing the "defining property" of a model with rational expectations to be "that
the forecasts made by agents within the model are no worse than the forecasts that
can be made by the economist who has the model"). Thus, if criminals follow a given
pattern of behavior, such as in the choice of victims as suggested above, victims will
subsequently behave as if they expect such patterns of choice from criminals, even if
these victims do not have the specific knowledge regarding criminals' motivations.
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It is important to specify the circumstances that justify the use of
global incentives and those that justify the use of local incentives.
The use of global incentives does not require any judgment concern-
ing the efficiency of any specific precaution. It requires ajudgment
concerning the overall patterns of behavior of potential victims, in
particular, whether potential victims as a whole over- or underinvest
in precautions. If one knows that most potential victims will
overinvest, one can provide global incentives to decrease investment
in the precautions and remedy this inefficiency. Alternatively, if one
knows that most potential victims will underinvest, one can design
global incentives aimed at increasing the overall investment in
precautions. Local incentives, in contrast, can be utilized precisely
under the opposite circumstances. In order to use local incentives,
one need not make judgments as to whether most victims are likely
to overinvest or underinvest in certain precautions. Instead, one
needs to judge the desirability of a certain precaution, and whether
its use should be reinforced or discouraged.
Problems of inefficient investment can be addressed by criminal
law norms that have either global or local applicability. A norm that
provides global incentives will be appropriate whenever there is a
phenomenon of global inefficient investment, while norms that
provide local incentives will be desirable whenever victims invest
suboptimally in a particular precaution. The remaining task is to
supply this general approach with concrete substance and to
demonstrate how it applies in practice, i.e., to describe criminal law
doctrines that serve to manipulate victims' investments in precau-
tions.
There are many examples of criminal law's use of local incentives
in controlling the victims' behavior. Mitigating the punishment for
offenders who commit homicide as a result of provoked, uncontrol-
lable passion provides incentives to potential victims to abstain from
provocative behavior. 9 Criminal law increases the risks imposed
upon provokers and thus increases the costs of provocation.
Similarly, the "no retreat rule," under which a person is permitted to
use deadly force to combat an attack directed against her even if she
could have avoided using the deadly force by retreating, is a means
39 See Harel, supra note 6, at 1211-17 (interpreting the doctrine of provocation as
an instance of a comparative fault scheme designed to deter individuals from
provoking others).
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to increase the risks imposed upon the victim (who is in this
particular case the initial aggressor).40
These doctrines, however, cannot remedy the general disposition
of potential victims to invest suboptimally in precautions because of
the limited scope of their operation. They can merely provide local
incentives that induce potential victims to take specific precautions
against specific crimes, based upon a judgment that a certain
precaution is efficient and, therefore, that its use should be encour-
aged. None of these doctrines, however, can remedy a more global
phenomenon of inefficiency, namely a disposition on the part of
victims to over- or underinvest in all types of precautionary measures.
The next Part will analyze the law of pre-crime activities and
interpret it as providing global incentives to potential crime victims
to reduce their investment in precautions.4 The global applica-
bility of the law governing pre-crime activities highlights the
importance of endorsing a victim-centered perspective in criminal
law.
IV. THE TREATMENT OF PRE-CRimE AcTIVITIES:
A VICTIM-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
The perpetrators of pre-crime activities such as attempt and
preparation are treated leniently under traditional criminal law.
Attempts are punished less severely than completed crimes and
preparation ordinarily is not subject to criminal liability at all.
Most U.S. jurisdictions stipulate that the perpetrator of an
attempted crime will be punished less severely than the perpetrator
of a completed crime.42 The rule is pervasive, despite a wide range
of critiques directed against it.4 The Model Penal Code's ("MPC)
o See id. at 1217-19 (discussing the rationale of the "no retreat rule").
41 Pre-crime activities include, under our definition, both preparation and attempt.
4' See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1988) (establishing sentences for
attempts at one-half the length of those for the completed crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 110.05 (McKinney 1987) (classifying, with certain exceptions, attempts as one grade
below the completed crime).
I Some foes of the practice believe that attempts should not be punished at all.
See, e.g., Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless
Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1109 (1992) (arguing that absent the imposition of
an immediate objective risk there ought to be no liability for attempts). Most critics
believe that the attempt should be punished in the same manner as the completed
crime. See, e.g., Lawrence Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes,
3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262 (1974) ("[I]n many cases, successful crimes and (the
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proposal to change the rule and equalize the sanctions imposed for
attempted crimes with those imposed for completed crimes has been
rejected by most jurisdictions in the United States."
The persistence of the practice despite the wide range of
criticism is indicative of deep-seated sentiments-sentiments that
were articulated by Adam Smith over 200 years ago:
Our resentment against the person who only attempted to do a
mischief, is seldom so strong as to bear us out in inflicting the same
punishment upon him, which we should have thought due if he had
actually done it. In the one case, the joy of our deliverance
alleviates our sense of the atrocity of his conduct; in the other, the
grief of our misfortune increases it.'
Smith was also quick to identify a conflicting intuition which guided
most of the critics of the practice: "His real demerit, however, is
undoubtedly the same in both cases, since his intentions were equally
corresponding) attempted crimes should be punished equally."); Sanford Kadish,
Supreme Court Review, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994) (arguing that the practice of punishing attempts
less severely than completed crimes is "not rationally supportable" by any theory of
criminal punishment).
"There are, however a few states that have equalized the sanction. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (West 1958) (providing that an attempt to commit a crime
is generally a felony of the same class and degree as a completed crime); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1995) (same). It is interesting to compare the situation in the
United States with that in other common lawjurisdictions. Some commentators have
argued that the gap between the sanctions for attempts and completed crimes is
gradually eroding in common law countries. See Yoram Shachar, The Fortuitous Gap
in Law and Morality, 6 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 12, 13 (1987) ("[P]unishment for attempt
has slowly... gain [ed] parity with maximum punishment in many of the common law
jurisdictions, most notably in England itself and in many of the American states.").
Indeed, some foreign jurisdictions changed their law to allow thejudge to impose the
same sanction for attempts and completed crimes. See, e.g., Criminal Attempts Act,
1981, ch. 47, § 4 (Eng.) (equalizing the punishment for attempts and completed
crimes); THE PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, § 23(2) (JosephJ.
Darby trans., 1987) (1975) (stating that "[a]n attempt may be punished less severely
than the completed crime," implying that an attempt may also be punished as
severely); THE PENAL CODE OF ISRAEL, § 34(d) (1977). But even in these cases, there
are important exceptions to the rule. See, e.g., Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, ch. 47,
§ 4(5) (Eng.) (maintaining attempt liability structure contained in Sexual Offenses
Act of 1956); THE PENAL CODE OF ISRAEL, §§ 27, 34(c) (1977). It has been noted that
even when the legislature imposes similar sanctions for attempts and completed
crimes, in practice the punishment for an attempt is less than the punishment for a
consummated crime. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 404 (2d
ed. 1983) (noting that the attempter usually will be punished less severely than the
criminal who completed the crime).
45ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 188 (Liberty Classics 1976)
(1759).
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criminal; and there is in this respect, therefore, an irregularity in the
sentiments of all men, and a consequent relaxation of discipline in
the laws of, I believe, all nations."
46
Contemporary scholarly literature has not advanced much beyond
the astute observations of Adam Smithy.4  The basic conflicting
intuitions identified by Adam Smith remain intact. On the one
hand, a completed crime raises more resentment and outrage than
an unsuccessful attempt to commit the very same crime." On the
4 Id.
47 See Bj6rn Burkhardt, Is There a RationalJustification for Punishing an Accomplished
Crime More Severely Than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 553, 556-57 (claiming
that no progress has been achieved in the last 200 years); Mordecha Kremnitzer, Is
There a Rational Justification for Punishing an Accomplished Crime More Severely Than an
Attempted Crime? A Comment on Prof. Dr Bj~rn Burkhardt's Paper, 4 B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 81,
95 (1990) (raising doubts about whether any progress has been made since Platol).
I Most legal scholarship assumes, often without any empirical support, that
individuals regard harm as relevant to criminal sanctioning. See, e.g., GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 483 (1978) (assuming that the reader would not
regard himself to be fairly treated if the punishment for "culpably causing" harm and
for having a "close call" were the same); 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 811-12 (London, MacMillan 1883) ("[I] t gratifies a
natural public feeling to choose out for punishment... one who actually has caused
great harm. . . ."); Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm
Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 748 (1988) ("This
approach is so ingrained in popular conceptions of responsibility... that it would be
both unrealistic and unpractical to disregard."); Kadish, supra note 43, at 688-89
(stating that most people's "unexamined intuitions" run toward treating completed
crimes more seriously than attempted crimes); Kremnitzer, supra note 47, at 81-82
(discussing the "gap" between the rational conclusion that attempts and completed
crimes should be punished equally, and the popular notion that the two should be
distinguished); Daniel M. Mandil, Note, Chance, Freedom and Criminal Liability, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 125, 131 (1987) (assuming that "community sensibilities" would be
to punish completed crimes more harshly than attempted crimes).
Some have challenged the claim that people tend to believe that punishment for
attempts should be less severe than the punishment for completed crimes. Yoram
Shachar believes that while such an intuition prevails on an instinctive level, it does
not prevail when individuals reflect on the subject matter. See Shachar, supra note 44,
at 23 ("[W] hile widely shared popular instinct is basically harm oriented, the Piagetian
school of experimental psychologists has tapped a vein of harm-free judgment in
human morality which is worthier as a model for official rule making, if public
opinion is to be followed at all."). Empirical research seems, however, to verify that
people in general believe that punishments for attempts should be lighter than the
punishments for completed crimes. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1995)
("In the view of our subjects, punishment ought not be imposed until a person has
reached a point of dangerous proximity to completion of the offense. Further, the
level of punishment for attempt ought to be significantly less than that for the
completed offense.").
We believe that these intuitions are prevalent. The difference in the intuitions
concerning the proper treatment of the perpetrator of an attempt and the perpetrator
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other hand, it seems that the culpability of the perpetrator of a
completed crime does not differ from the culpability of the perpetra-
tor of an attempt to commit the same crime if the failure is due to
circumstances that are beyond the perpetrator's control.49
of a completed crime resides not merely in ajudgment that the latter deserves harsher
punishment or that the latter is more blameworthy. There is a qualitatively different
attitude toward the two. Peter Winch beautifully articulated the difference when he
pointed out that a man who commits a murder becomes a "murderer," while a man
who attempts murder may become an "attempted murderer," but such a label has a
different ring to it. See Peter Heath & Peter Winch, Trying and Attempting, 45
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 209, 224 (Supp. 1971) ("That there are
differences [between the labels 'murderer' and 'attempted murderer'] is brought out
by the fact that it is perfectly possible to raise moral objections to any proposal legally
to treat attempted murderers in the same way as murderers.").
'9 A failure to complete a crime is often described as an event that happened
"merely" by chance or luck, rather than as one that is controlled by the agent. Hence,
there is a powerful intuition that a completed crime and an attempt deserve the same
punishment. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 896 (1991)
(arguing that under the "just deserts" theory of criminal liability, a failed attempter
and a successful criminal are "in terms of moral culpability, not materially differ-
ent .... [T]he difference in outcome is determined by chance rather than choice");
H.LA HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 113, 181
(1968) ("Why should the accidental fate that an intended harmful outcome has not
occurred be a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous
and equally wicked?"); Ashworth, supra note 48, at 733 ("[T]he essence of a criminal
attempt lies in the defendant's firm intention to commit the substantive offense, and
the failure to achieve that harm is invariably attributable to factors such as luck,
chance and misjudgment which do not significantly diminish culpability."); Burkhardt,
supra note 47, at 566-68 (citing the ageless principle that assigning less severe
punishment in occasions of fortuitous harmlessness cannot be squared with theories
of culpability, and concluding that "[a] satisfactory solution.., is not in sight"); R.A.
Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of Attempts, 9 LAW & PHIL. 1, 1 (1990-91)
("If punishment should depend on desert, it should depend on culpability rather than
on the actual causation of harm; on what the criminal wrongfully chose or tried to do,
not on the chance matter of what harm he actually did."); Kadish, supra note 48, at
689-90 (arguing that punishing attempts and completed crimes differently is
tantamount to allocating punishment by lottery); David Lewis, The Punishment That
Leaves Something to Chance 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 58 (1989) (recharacterizing the
current system of harsher punishments for successful attempts as a "covert penal
lottery"); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment, and the Role of Result, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 269,
275 (1984) (arguing for a system of punishment where the riskiness of the conduct
involved determines the appropriate sentence); J.G. Smith, The Element of Chance in
Criminal Liability, 1971 CRIM. L. REv. 63, 72 (arguing for the elimination of chance in
liability determinations by treating attempts and completed crimes identically);
Mandil, supra note 48, at 140 (arguing that the existence of luck in human affairs
provides an opportunity to examine the societal values underlying the differential
treatment of attempted and completed crimes).
Many, however, have argued against the view that describes the failure of an
attempt as an event that happened merely by chance or luck. These scholars have
noted that "among the cases of success we will find more instances of careful planning
and high-level performance than among the cases of failure" and therefore that the
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Different accusations are often directed against the doctrine of
preparation, which establishes the exemption of early pre-crime
activities from criminal liability. Drawing the distinction between
attempt and preparation has proven to be difficult and very often
arbitrary." The existence of such a distinction serves to decrease
even further the sanctions on pre-crime activities. Thus, both the
leniency of the treatment of attempt and the exemption for
preparation can be interpreted as ways in which criminal law reduces
the costs of pre-crime activities for criminals.
This Article suggests that the lenient treatment of attempt and
preparation can be rationalized as an incentive scheme directed
toward victims of crime. Thus, it is appropriate to begin with an
analysis of the way in which attempt and preparation are treated
under criminal law. Some of the existing theories that aim to justify
the lenient treatment of pre-crime activities will then be critically
explored. Given the nature of this investigation, the primary focus
will be the treatment of attempt and preparation within economic
analysis of law. Lastly, this Article will illustrate how, by endorsing a
victim-centered perspective, one can arrive at a new explanation for
why attempt and preparation ought to be punished less severely than
completed crimes. More specifically, this Article will argue that
punishing pre-crime activities less severely than completed crimes (as
reflected both in the lenient treatment of attempt as well as the
exemption of preparation from criminal liability) provides a global
incentive for potential victims to reduce their investment in
precautions. This Article will also suggest (although it does not
provide conclusive proof) that such a reduction may be socially
desirable given the incentives operating upon potential victims of
crime to overinvest in precautions against crime.
failure of an attempt is an indicator of a lesser threat from the activity. Kremnitzer,
supra note 47, at 87; see also Shachar, supra note 44, at 12 ("[T]he line between
causing harm and nearly causing it is in reality often demarcated by differences in the
perpetrator's own conduct.... ."); Note, Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense
70 YALE L.J. 160, 166 (1960) ("The much lower degree of punishment meted out to
attempters represents, in part, an unarticulated recognition that the person who tries
and fails is often less dangerous than the person who succeeds in his criminal
purpose."). For an excellent discussion of the role of luck in the law, see Note, The
Luck of the Law: Allusions to Fortuity in Legal Discourse, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1862, 1880-81
(1989) (arguing that events are characterized as fortuitous by the law when they are
irrelevant to the disposition of the case and that this characterization is often
conclusory in nature).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
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B. The Treatment of Attempts in Criminal Law:
A Brief Doctrinal Survey
The doctrinal treatment of attempts is often regarded as "more
intricate and difficult of comprehension than any other branch of
the criminal law."5 1 This Section will not discuss all the intricate
doctrinal questions concerning the treatment of attempts.52
Instead, it will discuss the actus reus and the mens rea required for an
attempt.
1. Actus Reus
Both courts and scholars distinguish between attempt, which is
punishable, and preparation, which is not punishable. Drawing the
boundary between unpunishable preparation and punishable attempt
has, however, haunted judges since the very criminalization of
attempts.5" The variety of tests proposed by scholars and judges-
tests which purport to distinguish between mere preparation and full-
fledged attempt-illustrates the complexity of the problem.54 The
5' Hicks v. Commonwealth, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025 (Va. 1889).
52 Two important doctrinal problems will not be discussed in this Article:
impossible attempts and the abandonment defense. Impossible attempts have
sometimes been considered unpunishable. SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(a-b)
(1985) (Impossibility) (noting that "the defense of impossibility... has sometimes
been successful in attempt prosecutions"). Contemporary scholarship criticizes this
view and many codes explicitly sanction impossible attempts. See id. ("Indeed, there
is very little modem authority that supports a retention of the impossibility defense
as such."). The abandonment defense has provided another important doctrinal
debate occupying much of the scholarly writings on the subject of attempts. See, e.g.,
Paul R. Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other Problems of
Temporal Individuation, 74 CAL. L. REV. 877, 881-82 (1986) (exploring the abandon-
ment defense and the modem doctrinal attitudes toward it).
11 See Regina v. Eagleton, 169 Eng. Rep. 826, 835 (CA. 1855) ("Some act is
required, and we do not think that all acts toward committing a misdemeanor are
indictable."); Donald Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 505, 505
("Ever since.., the test of remoteness [was introduced] in Eagleton (1855)
controversy has raged over this question of what criterion should be used to
determine" whether the accused's act is capable of incurring criminal responsibility
although a full crime has not been committed (footnote omitted)).
11 For a survey of the different tests, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5 (1985)
(General Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt) (reviewing various tests
"reflected in the case law when the Model Penal Code was being drafted"); Crocker,
supra note 43, at 1077-93 (arguing "that liability should attach if there has been an
attempt, per ordinary language, and the offender's actions have imposed a sufficient
risk of what was intended coming about"); G.L. Peiris, Liability for Inchoate Crme in
Commonwealth Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 30, 41-54 (1984) ("The resolution of this dilemma
is the object of a multiplicity of theoretical approaches, chief of which are the
proximity and unequivocality doctrines developed in the decided cases and in current
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proximity test questions whether the defendant's act was sufficiently
proximate to the intended crime.55 Under this view, no act is
indictable as an attempt unless it is a step toward the execution of
the criminal purpose and is an act directly approximating or
immediately connected with the commission of the offense that the
person has in mind.
56
The advocates of the proximity test provide a variety of tests as
to the required degree of proximity. These tests include the "last
proximate act" test57 and the "dangerous proximity to success"
test.5" Others have rejected the proximity test in favor of the
equivocality test originally developed by John Salmond.5 9 Under
the equivocality theory, an attempt is "an act of such a nature that it
academic writing."); Smart, supra note 53, at 505-10 (critiquing the various existing
tests under the equivocality and proximity doctrines and determining that "[n]one of
the adopted tests is jurisprudentially indefensible").
55 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 623 (2d ed. 1961) ("To be guilty of
attempt, the accused must have progressed a sufficient distance along the intended
path."). The test traces to Eagleton where it was formulated as follows: "Acts remotely
leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts
to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are. . . ." Eagleton, 169 Eng. Rep.
at 835.
56 For a good description and critique of the test, see 1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 182,
184 (J.W. Cecil Turner ed., 12th ed. 1964) ("It is therefore suggested that a practical
test for the actus reus in attempt is that the prosecution must prove that steps taken
by the accused must have reached the point when they themselves clearly indicate
what was the end towards which they were directed.").
" The test has been rejected by courts as well as by scholars as too rigid. See, e.g.,
Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 212, 215-16 (Va. 1978) (holding that the
commission of the last act was not necessary for a finding of attempted murder); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 4 (1985) ("Last Proximate Act") ("[T]here is
general agreement that when the actor has done all that he believes necessary to
commit the offense in question, he has committed an attempt.").
58 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes,J., dissenting); see also
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (Mass. 1897) ("The act done must come
pretty near to accomplishing that result before the law will notice it."); People v.
Bracey, 360 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (N.Y. 1977) (stating that the act must "'carry the
project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained'"
(quoting People v. Werblow, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (N.Y. 1925))); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01 cmt. 5(b) (1985) (Dangerous Proximity Doctrine) ("The test is based on the
assumption that.., until the actor's conduct becomes sufficiently dangerous, there
is not adequate reason for deterring it.").
'9 SeeJOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 404 (7th ed. 1924) ("No man can be safely
punished for his guilty purposes, save so far as they have manifested themselves in
overt acts which themselves proclaim his guilt."); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01
cmt. 5(f) (Res Ipsa Loquitor Test) ("[Ain attempt is committed when the actor's
conduct unequivocally manifests an intent to commit a crime."); J.W. Cecil Turner,
Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 230, 237 (1933-35) (stating that acts "must
be unequivocally referable to the commission of the specific crime").
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is itself evidence of the criminal intent with which it is done. A
criminal attempt bears criminal intent upon its face."60  The
equivocality theory, although endorsed by some courts and legisla-
tures,6' has received criticism from most scholars. 62  Advocates of
the probable desistance test have argued that a criminal attempt
requires an act that, in the ordinary course of events, would result in
the commission of a crime but for the intervention of an extraneous
factor. 3 The drafters of the MPC preferred to characterize attempt
60 SALMOND, supra note 59, at 404. Glanville Williams creditsJ.W. Cecil Turner for
describing the test as follows:
"If the example may be permitted, it is as though a cinematograph film,
which had so far depicted merely the accused person's acts without stating
what was his intention, had been suddenly stopped, and the audience were
asked to say to what end those acts were directed. If there is only one
reasonable answer to this question then the accused has done what amounts
to an 'attempt' to attain that end. If there is more than one reasonably
possible answer, then the accused has not yet done enough."
WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 629 (quotingJ.W. Cecil Turner, in MODERN APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL LAW 280-81 (1945)).
61 The test enjoyed some popularity in other jurisdictions. The New Zealand
Supreme Court employed a qualified version of the test in Campbell & Bradley v. Ward
[1955] N.Z.L.R. 471, 474-75 (affirming the principle that conviction for a criminal
attempt is only justified where the "act done with intent to commit [the crime] is in
itself sufficient evidence of the intent"). Most commentators, however, have criticized
the case. See, e.g., WILLIAls, supra note 55, at 630-31 ("In short, the theory is of no
help on the issue of proximity."); Stuart, supra note 53, at 508 ("There is little doubt
that the wisest course for the courts would be to admit their error and disassociate
themselves completely and frankly from the 'equivocality test.'"). Eventually, New
Zealand abolished this standard through legislation. See Crimes Act, 1961, § 72(3)
("An act done or omitted with intent to commit an offence may constitute an attempt
if it immediately or proximately connected with the intended offence, whether or not
there was any act unequivocally showing the intent to commit the offence."). Some
British courts have also endorsed this test. See, e.g., Davey v. Lee, 2 All E.R. 423, 425
(Q.B. 1967) ("[T]he actus reus necessary to constitute an attempt is complete... [if
its] doing... cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the
commission of the specific crime.").
62 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 9, at 581 (noting that "isolated behavior is always
ambiguous so far as mens rea is concerned," and therefore that it cannot be predictive
of intent); WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 629-30 ("[A] strict application of the test would
acquit many undoubted criminals."). Some exceptions, however, do exist. George
Fletcher endorses the equivocality theory and regards it as supportive of his more
general theory of "manifest criminality." See FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 144 ("[lf an
act is so equivocal that it does not generate apprehension, then it should not be
subject to either private or public suppression.").
63 See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 12 F. 52, 56 (C.C.D. Or. 1882) ("[T]o
constitute the attempt.., there must have been.., an act done in pursuance of [a
criminal] intention, that, apparently, in the usual course of events, would have
resulted in [a crime], unless interrupted by extraneous circumstances ... ."); State
v. Schwarzbach, 86 A. 423, 424 (NJ. 1913) (noting that in an adultery case, an attempt
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as "an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of
conduct planned to culminate in [the] commission of the crime."64
But while novel tests and sophisticated arguments were developed
to rebut these tests, some scholars raised doubts about the feasibility
and the desirability, of developing any test to distinguish between
completed crimes and attempts. This skepticism arises from a
suspicion as to whether a distinction between preparation and
attempt can be drawn regardless of what is being attempted. Given
that crimes are so radically different and diverse, it was argued that
there is no way in which a useful characterization of conduct
constituting an attempt could be made without specifying what the
completed crime would be.6" Even the less skeptical voices who
consists of the performance of overt acts that, if unhindered, would result in a crime);
State v. Brown, 95 N.C. 685 (1886) (holding that a conversation with an officer of the
court and other related actions were not sufficient to constitute attempted jury
tampering under a direct causation test); State v. Hurley, 64 A. 78, 79 (Vt. 1906)
(holding that the procurement "of tools adapted to jail breaking" did not establish an
attempt because the "act [stood] entirely unconnected with any further act looking
to their use"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5(d) (1985) (Probable
Desistance Test); Robert H. Skilton, The MentalElement in a CriminalAttempt, 3 U. PI=r.
L. REv. 181, 181 (1937) (stating that if an actor's intention, combined with an overt
act, "fully consummated, would have resulted in consequences within the prohibitions
of the criminal law, he may be guilty of a criminal attempt").
64 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985).
6 See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction,
40 YALE LJ. 53, 57 (1930) ("These crimes are aimed at different kinds of conduct and
to protect society against entirely different things."). Arnold endorsed a legal realist
position and argued that no useful general tests could be developed for attempts as
a general category. The claim that the boundary between preparation and attempt
depends upon the crime attempted or on other facts particular to the case at hand
is also supported by somejudges and many traditional criminal law scholars. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897) (noting the difficulty of
balancing proximity to completion and expectation of success); FLETCHER, supra note
48, at 141 ("[A] sensible approach requires that some attention be paid to the
problems characteristic of different offenses."); OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 68-69 (1923); WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 622 ("No exhaustive test can be stated:
The only general rule is that mere 'preparation' for the crime is not enough-but this
is only the proximity rule in negative form."); P.R. Glazebrook, Should We Have a Law
of Attempted Crime?, 85 L.Q. REV. 28, 36 (1969) ("Why, then, should it be supposed
that a single formula might ... serve to identify the actus reus of such disparate
offences as attempting to murder, attempting to obtain property by deception, and
attempting to commit an act of gross indecency?"); Rollin M. Perkins, CriminalAttempt
and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. REV. 319, 327 (1955) ("Each case.., must be
considered in light of all the facts involved."); Paul Kichyun Ryu, Contemporary Problems
of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1175 (1957) ("Answers to the questions
involving attempt cannot be derived by a purely logical method of deduction from a
preconceived notion of 'attempt.'"); Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 821, 845 (1928) ("The line between preparation and attempt, however, must
at best depend largely upon the particular circumstances of each case. .. ").
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support maintaining the distinction between preparation and attempt
concede that the characterization of the actus reus in attempt must
remain imprecise and that the difference between preparation and
attempt is a "difference in degree... [rather than] in kind."6" The
commentary of the MPC acknowledges the imprecision of its own
guidelines67 and adds a list specifying conduct that, as a matter of
law, can be categorized as attempt. The drafters included the list in
order to remedy some of the imprecision inherent in the doctrine. 8
At the same time, other scholars challenged not merely the
feasibility of drawing a precise distinction between preparation and
attempt, but also the desirability of drawing such a distinction. The
basis is that:
"The exact point at which [such preliminary steps] become
criminal cannot, in the nature of things, be precisely ascertained,
nor is it desirable that such a matter should be made the subject of
great precision. There is more harm than good in telling people
precisely how far they may go without risking punishment in the
pursuit of an unlawful object."
69
Skepticism concerning the feasibility or the desirability of
drawing a precise boundary between preparation and attempt does
not, however, overshadow the importance of drawing some bound-
aries. Most legal systems endorse a three-stage scheme under which
6 HALL, supra note 9, at 584. Holmes adopted the same position in Commonwealth
v. Peaslee 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901). There, Holmes said:
[P]reparation is not an attempt. But some preparations may amount to an
attempt. It is a question of degree. If the preparation comes very near to
the accomplishment of the act, the intent to complete it renders the crime
so probable that the act will be a misdemeanor .... As was observed in a
recent case, the degree of proximity held sufficient may vary with circum-
stances, including, among other things, the apprehension which the
particular crime is calculated to excite.
Id. at 56.
Naturally, this position raises concerns of undue vagueness, which is inconsistent
with the rule of law. SeeAshworth, supra note 48, at 768 ("[T]he law of attempts fails
to specify adequately the stage at which a person becomes liable to conviction.").
67 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 6(a) (1985) (Requirements of "Substantial
Step" and Corroboration of Purpose) ("[T]he Code retains the element of
imprecision found in most of the other approaches to the preparation-attempt
problem.").
63 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 explanatory note at 297 (1985) ("Subsection (2)
elaborates on the preparation-attempt problem by indicating what is meant by the
concept of 'substantial step. .. '").
11 Glazebrook, supra note 65, at 35 n.36 (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 83 (2d ed.
1890)).
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completed crimes are punished harshly, attempts are often punished
less harshly, and preparation is not punished at all.7 The boundary
between preparation and attempt, however, is imprecise. It is
possible that its imprecision is inherent and cannot be remedied,71
but legislatures and courts can affect the position of the boundary
between attempt and preparation by expanding the domain of one
and shrinking the domain of the other. Policy considerations should
determine whether such an increase or decrease in the scope of
activities that are classified as preparation is desirable, even if
drawing a precise line between preparation and attempt is neither
feasible nor desirable. Thus, despite the imprecision of the test
governing this issue, it is valuable to explore the effects of redrawing
the boundaries between preparation and attempt. In particular, it is
important to examine the effects of redrawing this boundary on the
incentives operating on both criminals and victims.
2. Mens Rea
The mental element required in criminal attempts is that of
actual intent to commit the actus reus of the crime attempted.72
70 Theoretically, rather than dividing the criminal act into three discrete stages,
one could increase the criminal sanction progressively in accordance with the stage
of completion of the crime. This idea is hardly novel. In fact, it has been used in
some legal systems. See Eugene Rankin Meehan, The Trying Problem of CriminalAttempt-
Historical Perspectives, 14 U. BRITSH COLUMBIA L. REv. 137, 140 (1979) ("[I]n Roman-
Dutch law, an attempt to commit a crime was itself punishable, no distinction being
made between acts close to and remote from the 'target' crime, although the more
proximate were the acts in question, the more severe was the punishment.").
Some provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can be regarded as
implementing precisely such a scheme, where the degree of completion of a crime
determines the severity of the sanction. Section 2A2.1.(b) (1) of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual specifies the punishment for attempted murder as follows: "(A)
if the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase [the
sanction] by 4 levels; (B) if the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by
2 levels; or (C) if the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A)
and (B), increase by 3 levels." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.1 (b) (1)
(1994).
A general rule that grades the sanctions progressively in accordance with the
degree of completion of the offense cannot be easily administered due to the
intractable difficulties in determining the degree of completion of the offense.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
7 See WILIAMS, supra note 55, at 618-21 (arguing that a conviction of attempt
requires a demonstration of intent "to consummate the particular crime"); WILLIAMS,
supra note 44, at 406-10 (explaining that the law of criminal attempt requires that one
have actual intent to commit the underlying crime). The same rule applies in the
United States;J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts Re-Examined-I, 1962 G]RIM.
L. REv. 135, 135 ("[T]he mens rea which must be proved to establish an attempt...
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Attempt requires intention as to the actus reus of the complete
offense even if the complete offense is one that requires merely
negligence, or recklessness, or strict liability. For example, a person
who negligently attempts to drive a car with no brakes may not be
convicted of attempt to drive a dangerous vehicle despite the fact
that, had he succeeded, he would have been convicted of the
completed act. This position has been criticized by some scholars,
73
but it has been endorsed by the MPC.74 A debate surrounds the
precise scope of this rule.
75
is usually.., only an actual intention to cause the actus reus of the crime attempted
... ."). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985) (stating that to be guilty of a
criminal attempt a person must "purposely engage[] in conduct that would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be"). The
explanatory notes to the Model Penal Code emphasize that the mzns rea required in
this section of the MPC is "designed to follow the conventional pattern of limiting the
crime of attempt to purposive conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 (1985)
(Requirement of Purpose); see also Sayre, supra note 65, at 837-42 (arguing that an
attempt requires intent as to all the elements of a crime because "[i]f none of the
consequences which the defendant sought to achieve constitutes a crime, surely his
unsuccessful efforts to achieve his object cannot constitute a criminal attempt").
73 See HALL, supra note 9, at 597-98 (noting the ambiguity of the meaning of
"intention" in several court cases); Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysis of Criminal
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 890-96 (1994) (arguing that "[n]o greater culpability than
that required by the substantive offense ought to be required for attempt liability");
Smith, supra note 72, at 136-40 (arguing that "intention need not extend to all the
elements in the actus reus on a charge of attempt"); Donald Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence
and Attempts, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. 647, 655-62 (arguing that recklessness or negligence
should be a sufficient mens rea to support an attempt conviction for a crime that
requires a mens rea of recklessness or negligence, as appropriate).
7 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1) (requiring that in addition to "acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime," the actor must
intend or believe that her conduct or omission will cause the commission of the crime
or constitute a substantial step in its commission). Some common law systems seem
to reject this principle. See Peiris, supra note 54, at 32-33 (noting that courts in
Canada, South Africa and Scotland do not require direct intent to establish attempt
liability).
75 It is clear that the requirement of purpose applies to the conduct of the
perpetrator as well as the results. But many believe that the purpose need not
encompass all of the circumstances included in the definition of the offense. See, e.g.,
ASH-vORTH, supra note 49, at 400 (stating that "if two men set out to have sexual
intercourse with two women, not caring whether they consent or not, it would be
absurd if the one who achieved penetration was convicted of rape" while the other
who did not achieve penetration despite trying was acquitted of attempted rape);
Peiris, supra note 54, at 34-35 ("[R]ecklessness as to circumstances surrounding the
consequence supplies adequate mens rea in respect of a criminal attempt."); Skilton,
supra note 63, at 183 ("The presence of an added circumstance... doles] not take
away the fact that the defendant may be said to have intended certain criminal
consequences .... ."); Smith, supra note 72, at 136-40 ("[I]ntention need not extend
to all the elements in the actus reus on a charge of attempt."); Glanville Williams, The
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In the following subsections, the traditional justifications for the
law of attempts will be explored. We will demonstrate that the
existing justifications rely exclusively on a perpetrator-centered
perspective.
C. Perpetrator-Centered Theories
It has been established that criminal law has traditionally been
lenient regarding pre-crime activities. This leniency has two primary
manifestations. First, criminal law norms governing attempts often
maintain a gap between the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators
of attempts and the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators of
completed crimes. Second, criminal law maintains a distinction
between preparation and attempt, and exempts a broad range of pre-
crime activities from criminal liability by labelling these activities
"preparation." As mentioned, the relative leniency of criminal law
toward pre-crime activities has often puzzled criminal law scholars as
well as moral philosophers.76 Scholars differ radically in the result
of their normative investigation. Despite the divergence in the views
and perspectives of various scholars, however, a perpetrator-centered
perspective has been consistently maintained.
1. Nonutilitarian Theory
Nonutilitarians have offered several theories that focus on aspects
which are perpetrator-regarding. One branch of theories focuses on
the arguably lesser culpability of the perpetrator of an attempt
relative to the culpability of the perpetrator of a completed crime.77
Problem of Reckless Attempts, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 365, 366-67, 374-75 ("[I]n the case of
attempts... it is enough that the defendant was reckless as to the circumstances.").
But see Richard Buxton, Circumstances, Consequences and Attempted Rape, 1984 GRIM. L.
REV. 25, 26-28 (arguing that "a statutory rule attributing a different mens rea in respect
of circumstances and of consequences.., would lead to confusion"). For an attempt
to provide a theoretical justification for distinguishing the conduct from the
circumstances, see Arnold N. Enker, Mens Rea and Criminal Attemp4 1977 AM. B.
FoUND. REs.J. 845, 866-78 (arguing that conduct is more likely to demonstrate intent
than is the existence of external circumstances).
The narrow view under which intent applies to the conduct and the consequenc-
es, but not to the circumstances, has been endorsed by the MPC. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 (1985) (Requirement of Purpose) ("The requirement of purpose
extends to the conduct of the actor and to the results that his conduct causes, but his
purpose need not encompass all of the circumstances included in the formal
definition of the substantive offense.").
76 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
The general term used to describe these theories is moral luck. For a discussion
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Another branch of theories focuses on the liberties of the perpetra-
tor, which arguably are infringed if attempts are punished.7 Yet
another branch focuses on the opportunity of the perpetrator of an
attempt to desist-an opportunity of which the perpetrator of the
completed crime deprived herself. This opportunity to desist is
necessary in order to provide the perpetrator with an opportunity to
repent.79 All these nonutilitarian approaches share a common focus
on the perpetrator of the crime and are therefore classified here as
perpetrator-centered theories.
2. Utilitarian Theory
Utilitarian theories in general and economic analysis of law in
particular also adhere to a perpetrator-based perspective. These
theories maintain that the differential treatment of attempts is
intended to provide incentives for the perpetrators of crime to desist
and, hence, to prevent the harms. Under this view, the lesser
punishment for an attempt is aimed to induce the perpetrator to
abandon his plan and refrain from completing the crime. 0 Again,
this explanation concentrates on the effect of the sanction on the
perpetrator of the crime.8" Let us explore in some detail the
of this theory by various authors, see MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
71 See generally Crocker, supra note 43, at 1059 (arguing against criminal liability
based on the dangerousness or depravity of a criminal and arguing for criminal
liability based on the extent of a criminal's "actual imposition upon his victim or
society").
79 See Duff, supra note 49, at 34-35 ("IT]he failure of even a complete criminal
attempt gives the criminal.., a chance not just to repent his crime (a chance which
the successful criminal has as well), but to give effect to that repentance by refraining
from a further attempt to commit the crime.").
I Originally, the argument appeared in CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS 68-69 (David Young trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1986) (1764). For
effective critiques, see HART, supra note 49, at 130 ("[T]here seems [to be] no reason
on any form of deterrent theory.., for punishing the unsuccessful attempt less
severely than the completed crime."); Lewis, supra note 49, at 53 ("[W]ihat sense can
we make of leniency toward a completed attempt-one that puts a victim at risk of
harm, and fails only by luck to do actual harm?").
" There is, however, one important exception to the perpetrator-centered
perspective. Some utilitarians have pointed out that the victim of a crime has strong
vengeful feelings toward the criminal, so that hurting the offender gives the victim
something he values. Jeremy Bentham labelled these sentiments as "vindicative
satisfaction." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS AND LEGISLATION 171 n.1
(Hafier Publ'g Co. 1961) (1781) ("Satisfaction thus administered to a party injured
... may be styled a vindictive satisfaction .... ."). These sentiments would be
particularly intense if the crime was successfully completed. See HART, supra note 49,
at 131 ("Certainly the resentment felt by a victim actually injured is normally much
greater than that felt by the intended victim.... ."); Ashworth, supra note 48, at 744-
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traditional justifications for the differential treatment of attempts in
the law and economics literature and establish the claim that these
justifications are exclusively perpetrator-centered.
3. Economic Theory
Economic theories that examine the optimal punishment of
attempts have been offered separately by Posner and Shavell. Posner
argues that attempts ought to be punished in order to increase the
expected cost of crime to criminals.8 2 In this way, additional
deterrence is generated without making the punishment for the
completed offense more severe. Posner supports the practice of
punishing attempts less severely than completed crimes on a theory
of "marginal deterrence," which suggests that once a criminal
commits a punishable act, he should be provided with incentives to
refrain from committing a more severe act."3 According to this
theory, once a criminal places himself on the continuum of severity
of criminal actions, marginal deterrence is required to deter him
from moving along this continuum toward more severe acts.8 4 In
46 ("[S] ince in attempted crimes there may not be an injured party, it would seem to
follow that this element should be deducted from punishments for these crimes.").
Many have resisted this argument by pointing out the illegitimacy of taking into
account vengeful sentiments. See HART, supra note 49, at 131 ("[T]he question arises,
if this form of retributive [punishment] depends on the connexion between blame
and resentment, whether the law should give effect to such a theory."); Kadish, supra
note 43, at 692-94 ("[E]ven if... the victim received a restorative amount of pleasure
from the offender's suffering, it is not the morality of retributive punishment that
would have been demonstrated, but the desirability of satisfying the vengeful feelings
of the victim .... " (footnote omitted)). This argument is, under our classification
scheme, a victim-centered one and is therefore an exception to the general tendency
of criminal law to focus upon perpetrator-centered arguments.
82 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1217-18 (providing a method for increasing levels
of anticipated punishment costs without actually raising sanctions for completed
crimes).
83 The original theory of marginal deterrence in modem law and economics
scholarship was developed by George Stigler. See Stigler, supra note 14. An excellent
synthesis of this theory was advanced later by Shavell. See Steven Shavell, A Note on
Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 345-55 (1992) (pointing out that
marginal deterrence requires graduated sanction only when enforcement is
.general"); Shavell, Specific Versus Genera supranote 14, at 1091-1101 (suggesting that
where enforcement efforts are general, optimal sanctions rise in proportion to the
harmfulness of the acts); see also Louis L. Wilde, Criminal Choice, Non-Monetary
Sanctions, and Marginal Deterrence: A Nornative Analysis, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 333-
44 (1992) (discussing a model which illustrates that marginal deterrence is neither
necessary nor sufficient in cases involving nontrivial criminal sanctions).
84 Stigler's and Shavell's treatments of marginal deterrence intended to show why
it is desirable to punish some offenses less severely than others; namely, why it would
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the context of attempts, marginal deterrence is required "to give
offenders an incentive to change their minds at the last moment.""5
That is, once the criminal act begins, it is desirable to offer the actor
a reason not to complete it. Additionally, Posner argues, prepara-
tions to commit a crime (such as the announcement of one's
intention to do so) should not be treated as attempts and should not
be punished at all because of the lower probability that such
preparations will actually lead to harm. 6
Shavell, in a more systematic analysis, raises similar justifications
for the treatment of attempts, suggesting that punishing attempts
raises the expected sanction without increasing the magnitude of the
sanction for the completed offense." If, under some constraints,
the magnitude of the sanction for the completed crime cannot be
raised, and if detection of attempted acts is a byproduct of the
detection effort invested against completed acts, society can gain
added deterrence "cheaply" by punishing the detected attempts.
Invoking the marginal deterrence argument to justify a less severe
punishment of attempts, Shavell points out that such treatment is
useful only when the criminal can potentially reevaluate and
abandon his act. In the case of attempts that were fully carried out
yet failed due to chance, Shavell argues that marginal deterrence
plays no role, and, as such, these attempts should be punished as
severely as completed acts. 8
be disadvantageous to punish every single offense with the maximum feasible sanction.
See Shavell, supra note 83, at 351 (reiterating that marginal deterrence can be
achieved also by graduating the probabilities of apprehension, not solely by graduated
sanctions); Shavell, Specific Versus General supranote 14, at 1090-1101 (demonstrating
that graduated sanctions are desirable only when enforcement is general); Stigler,
supra note 14, at 530-31 (stating the concern for marginal deterrence).
s5 Posner, supra note 16, at 1217.
1 See id. at 1218.
87 See Shavell, supra note 17, at 1249-52 (noting that the punishment of attempts
can raise expectations of punishment without actually increasing the magnitude of
overall punishment); Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 436 (1990) [hereinafter Shavell, Deterrence] (suggesting that a partial
justification for the punishment of attempts is that such punishment raises the
probability of any sanctions being imposed, thus increasing deterrence).
13 Shavell considered the possibility that offering less severe punishment for
attempts that failed by chance would still generate marginal deterrence by preventing
the criminal from attempting again and subjecting himself to the risk of an increased
penalty for subsequent success. Shavell rejected this argument by arguing that
marginal deterrence from renewed attempts can be provided, even if attempts are
sanctioned as severely as completed acts, by raising the sanction with the number of
attempts. See Shavell, Deterrence, supra note 87, at 456.
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Shavell stresses an additional "statistical" justification for
punishing attempts less severely. He argues that when an attempt
fails, it is indicative of the lesser danger that the act imposes. Since
different acts may pose different degrees of dangerousness, and since
this degree is not always evident, a failed attempt may be regarded
as evidence that the act was, a priori, less likely to result in harm;
failed attempts should therefore be punished less severely.89
Although many economists endorse the Posner-Shavell treatment
of attempts,9" the theory is not without its difficulties. Its marginal
deterrence application justifies the lenient treatment of attempts as
providing incentives for rational criminals to "change, their minds"
and abandon a plan that they have already begun to pursue. One
may wonder why rational individuals would even begin the pursuit of
a crime if they expect to change their minds in the process. If the
incremental sanction imposed on completed acts is sufficient to
generate marginal deterrence, why does it not generate full deter-
rence and prevent the initiation of pre-crime activities? After all, a
criminal who commits an attempt intends it to succeed, and takes
into account the sanction for completed acts. If that does not deter
him, why would the same sanction deter him when he has already
initiated the act and has only to decide whether to finalize it? Unless
the criminal learns new information that leads him to reevaluate the
desirability of completing the crime, there is no reason to expect
marginal deterrence to operate upon him. The very same assump-
tion that underlies the marginal deterrence theory-the assumption
of rational behavior-raises difficulty in the consistent application of
the theory.91
Additional difficulties arise with respect to the statistical
justification of attempts. In some cases, the failure of the attempt
does indeed provide an indication of its lesser degree of dangerous-
ness. But many attempts fail strictly due to chance, and do not
reflect the lesser dangerousness of the particular perpetrator. In
such cases, there is no statistical basis for lenient treatment.
92
s See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Samuel Kramer, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt:
Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
398, 415-16 (1990-91) (suggesting that the punishment for attempts should be scaled
according to the criminal's private benefit instead of the degree of social harm
inflicted by her acts).
91 For further discussion of this difficulty, see Shavell, Deterrence, supra note 87, at
455-56.
92 See id. at 452-54 (discussing this objection and concluding that the statistical
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Further, courts may, and do, apply inference methods other than
statistics to assess the dangerousness of an act, in which case the
statistical treatment becomes redundant.
Aside from the analytical difficulties of the Posner-Shavell
approach, its perspective is limited because it is strictly perpetrator-
centered. Posner and Shavell focus exclusively on the incentives
guiding the perpetrators of crime and (as in the statistical justifica-
tion) on how courts can distinguish ex post between different types
of perpetrators. In light of this unilateral dimension, and the evident
difficulties it raises, the next Section of this Article will explore a
different economic understanding of the law of attempt. It will
argue that the treatment of attempts can be rationalized by a victim-
centered perspective. This approach does not contradict or conflict
with the perpetrator-centered approach. In fact, the victim-centered
approach shares the rationality and efficiency premises of the Posner-
Shavell approach and complements it to form a broader and more
applicable set of justifications for the criminal law's treatment of
attempts.
D. Punishing Pre-Crime Activities: A Victim-Centered Perspective
Leniency toward pre-crime activities is a mechanism that provides
global incentives for potential victims to reduce their investment in
precautions. In defending this claim two aspects of the legal
treatment of pre-crime activities will be addressed: the gap between
the sanctions for attempts and completed crimes, and the reluctance
of criminal law to punish preparation. Both principles are subtle
mechanisms that primarily reduce the expected costs of punishment
for criminals who target overly cautious victims. Consequently, both
principles provide incentives for criminals to shift the aim of their
activity from less cautious victims to more cautious ones and thereby
provide incentives for potential victims to reduce their investment in
precautions.
Providing victims with incentives to reduce their precautions is
desirable in situations in which victims are more likely to overinvest.
Some concerns leading to the conclusion that victims indeed
overinvest in precautions will be highlighted in this Section.
However, the two facets of the analysis, the positive and the norma-
justification of the lenient treatment of attempts is justified only if the attempt was
deliberately abandoned by the perpetrator, and not if the attempt was interrupted, only
in the former case does a failed attempt indicate a lesser dangerousness).
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tive, are independent of each other. One may dispute the Article's
normative claim that victims ought to be given incentives to reduce
their investment in precaution, while at the same time embrace the
positive characterization of the incentive effects of the law of attempt.
1. The Incentive Effects of Sanctioning Pre-Crime Activities
a. Attempts Versus Completed Acts
Precautions against crime taken by potential victims reduce the
chances of successful completion of the crime either by increasing
the chances that the perpetrator will not complete the activities he
plans to commit, or by increasing the chances that, even if the
perpetrator completes his plan, the desired consequences of the plan
will not be realized. Consequently, crimes directed against more
cautious victims are more likely to fail and end up being classified as
attempts and punished accordingly. The more potential victims
invest in precautions, the more likely they are to be the victims of
unsuccessful attempts rather than victims of completed crimes.
The very same conclusion is grounded in an additional, indepen-
dent observation. Precautions taken by potential victims of crime
force potential criminals to go through a longer sequence of pre-
crime activities. The longer sequence of pre-crime activities exposes
the perpetrator to a greater risk of being interrupted before the
completion of the crime. Hence, a crime directed against a more
cautious victim is more likely to wind up being classified as an
attempt than a crime directed against a less cautious victim.
These findings imply that criminals targeting highly cautious
victims are more likely to be influenced by sanctions imposed for
attempts than criminals operating against less cautious victims
because it is the former type of criminal whose actions are likely to
result in unsuccessful attempts. As the sanction for attempts
decreases relative to the sanction for completed acts, the expected
cost of sanctions facing criminals decreases, regardless of the type of
victim they target. This expected cost of sanction decreases more if
the criminal targets an overly cautious victim. Consequently, as the
sanction for attempts decreases, cautious victims become more
attractive targets. Thus, some criminals are likely, under a rule that
exculpates or mitigates the sanctions for attempts, to substitute their
targets and choose to act against more cautious victims, rather than
against less cautious ones.
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The following hypothetical example should illustrate the
incentive effects that mitigated sanctions have on criminals. Suppose
victims can take one of two levels of precautions, "high" or "low." If
the low level of precaution is taken, the criminal's probability of
success is .75 (the probability of failure is .25), and if the high level
of precaution is taken, the criminal's probability of success is .25 (the
probability of failure is .75). Also assume that the probability of
detecting and sanctioning a criminal is .4, independent of whether
the act succeeds.93
If the criminal commits a completed crime and is apprehended,
his sanction is assumed to be 100. To illustrate the effect of a
mitigated treatment of attempts, let us see how the criminal's
incentives change with the sanction for a failed attempt. Denote the
sanction for an attempt by S. If the criminal targets a low-precaution
victim, his expected sanction is:
(.75 x .4 x 100) + (.25 x .4 x S)
= 30 + (.1 x S).
If, however, the criminal targets a high-precaution victim, his
expected sanction is:
(.25 x .4 x 100) + (.75 x .4 x S)
= 10 + (.3 x S).
We can graph the criminal's expected sanction as a function of S:
FIGURE 1:
Expected Sanction
Exp. Sanction
(High Precautions)
Exp. Sanction
(Low Precautions)
.2 I
100
S
9 It is plausible that the probability of detecting and sanctioning attempts is
different than that of completed crimes. This possibility is examined infra Part IV.D.2.
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The two lines in Figure I represent the expected sanction costs
of targeting high-precaution and low-precaution victims. We see that
if S < 100, the expected sanction is higher when targeting a low-
precaution victim than when targeting a high-precaution victim. In
this case, the criminal will have an incentive to act against a high-
precaution victim, and benefit from a lower expected sanction. As
the sanction for attempts, S, decreases, the gap between the expected
sanctions for targeting the two types of victims increases, and
consequently, high-precaution victims become more attractive.
Conversely, if S > 100, the expected sanction will be lower when
targeting a low-precaution victim, and the criminal will have an
increased incentive to act against such victims.
To illustrate this point further, consider the choice between four
possible sanctions for attempts. In Case I, attempts are punished the
same as completed crimes-a sanction of 100. In Case II, attempts
are treated more leniently, and receive half the sanction-50. In
Case III, attempts carry a sanction of 25, and Case IV involves the
ultimate leniency toward attempts-a sanction of 0. The following
table summarizes the expected sanctions the criminal faces:
TABLE I
Case I Case U Case III Case IV
Expected Sanction if Precautions 40 35 32.5 30
are "Low"
Expected Sanction if Precautions 40 25 17.5 10
are "High"
As criminal law moves toward a more lenient treatment of
attempts, the expected sanction falls for attempts against both high
and low-precaution victims.9 4 But, as the table demonstrates, the
sanction falls more sharply if the precaution level is high. In the
extreme, if attempts are not punished at all (Case IV), the difference
11 To understand how the expected sanctions are calculated, take the row of "Low
Precautions" as an example. We have calculated that the expected sanction in this
row is 30 + (.1 x S). When S = 100 (Case I), the expected sanction will be 30 + (.1 x
100) = 40. When S = 50 (Case II), the expected sanction will be 30 + (.1 x 50) = 35,
etc. Similarly, for the "High Precautions" row, we use the formula of 10 + (.3 x S),
so that when, for example, S = 25 (Case III), the expected sanction is 10 + (.3 x 25)
= 17.5.
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in the expected sanction is 20 (an expected sanction of 30 if the
precaution level is low, 10 if high). Thus, as the treatment of
attempts becomes more lenient, high levels of precaution lose more
of their deterrent factor.
The sanction for attempts can also be raised above the sanction
for completed crimes to generate the opposite effect. Figure I
demonstrates that as S increases above 100, the expected sanction for
targeting high-precaution victims increases relative to the expected
sanction for targeting low-precaution victims. This "super-punitive"
treatment of attempts may be difficult to justify on other grounds,
but it does provide the incentive for victims to better protect
themselves.
The argument presented above suggests that a high level of
precaution loses some of its benefit for the victims when the law's
treatment of attempts becomes lenient. To be sure, there are
benefits to a high level of precaution that victims may still enjoy. For
one, the reduced likelihood that the crime will be successfully
completed is perhaps the most significant benefit of setting a high
level of precaution, and this benefit is not affected by a lenient
treatment of attempts. Thus, from the criminal's point of view,
targeting a high-precaution victim has an advantage relative to
targeting low-precaution victims, namely the lower-expected sanction
(and perhaps also a higher "prize," if precautions are positively
correlated with victims' wealth). Nevertheless, targeting high-
precaution victims has a disadvantage-the lower probability of
success. The ultimate choice, therefore, depends on many ad hoc
parameters that are outside the scope of this Article, including the
observability of precautions and the wealth of the victim.95 This
Article's claim ignores many important benefits that victims enjoy
from setting high levels of precautions, and it rests on the analysis of
merely one benefit that arises from precautions-the deterrent effect
of the expected sanction. It concludes that, as the sanction for
attempts decreases, the deterrent effect of precautions subsides, and,
thus, the relative attractiveness of the high-precaution victim
increases. Overall, the more lenient the treatment of attempts, the
more likely are criminals to target high-precaution victims.
05 Another element that affects a criminal's choice between high-precaution and
low-precaution victims is the probability of being detected, which may vary depending
on whether the crime succeeds or fails. An analysis of this effect is presented infra
Part IV.D.2.
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In light of this effect on criminals' choice of victims, the victims'
incentives to engage in precautions can now be examined. Under a
system that mitigates the sanctions for attempts, victims will find it
less profitable to engage in a high level of precaution relative to a
system that punishes attempts and completed acts equally. Establish-
ing a high level of precaution is less profitable because the precau-
tions will cause more criminal acts to fail and, thus, be classified as
attempts. As argued, the reduced sanction for attempts raises
criminals' tendency to select highly cautious victims. Thus, victims
who choose a high level of precaution will become more appealing
targets if attempts are sanctioned leniently. Consequently, victims
will have an incentive to reduce their precaution level. As the
example above demonstrates, victims' incentives to choose a low level
of precaution are augmented when attempts are treated more
leniently. By choosing a low level of precaution, victims forgo some
of the preventive benefit, but instead succeed to be protected by a
relatively higher expected sanction, that is, to deter more criminals
from targeting them.
In the analysis introduced above, the law of attempts provides
global incentives to reduce victims' precautions. These incentives are
global because they span many types of victim behavior and across
many types of criminal offenses. Any type of activity by victims that
reduces the chance that a crime will succeed-protecting one's
home, carrying defensive weapons, monitoring one's agents, etc.-
will be influenced by this incentive device.
Lastly, it should be noted that the victim-centered perspective
holds regardless of the content of the law. Different regimes may
treat criminal attempts differently-some more leniently, others more
strictly. Each will affect the victims' incentives differently, with the
stricter regimes leading to higher levels of precaution. What this
positive analysis demonstrates is that by focusing on victims'
incentives, the interplay between the sanctioning policy and the
levels of precaution can be determined. Before turning to the
normative evaluation of the different treatments of attempt, another
positive aspect of the law of pre-crime activities will be examined-
the incentive effects of distinguishing between preparation and
attempt.
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b. Attempt Versus Preparation
Part IV.B surveyed one of the more intricate doctrinal problems
in criminal law, namely, the elusive boundaries between preparation
and attempt. While it was argued that drawing a precise boundary
between preparation and attempt is not manageable, it was nonethe-
less maintained that criminal law norms can expand the stage of
unpunishable preparation and, hence, diminish the stage of
punishable attempt or, alternatively, diminish the stage of prepara-
tion and expand the stage of attempt. This Section will argue that
the choice to expand one stage at the expense of the other affects
victims' investments in precautions.
The activities preceding crimes that are directed against overly
cautious victims are longer and more complex than the activities
preceding crimes directed against less cautious victims. The risk that
pre-crime activities targeting cautious victims will be interrupted (and
that the perpetrator will be subject to the sanctions that the legal
system imposes upon these activities) is therefore larger. Criminals
who target cautious victims are affected more significantly by the
sanctions imposed by the criminal system on pre-crime activities.
Expanding the unpunishable stage for pre-crime activities at the
expense of the punishable stage reduces the expected cost of
sanctions facing criminals, regardless of the type of victims they
target. But this expected cost of sanctions decreases more if the
criminals target the more cautious victims. Thus, the longer the
unpunishable preparation stage, the greater the incentives for
criminals to target cautious victims. These dispositions on the part
of criminals influence, in turn, the investment in precautions by
potential victims of crime. For reasons similar to those discussed
above, the longer the unpunishable stage of pre-crime activities, the
smaller the investment in precautions by potential victims. The
increased disposition of criminals to target cautious victims will
induce potential victims to reduce their investment in precautions.
c. Summary
Modifying the sanctions for attempts and modifying the bound-
aries between preparation and attempt can be described as legal
mechanisms aimed at altering the expected costs of pre-crime
activities. Criminal law can treat pre-crime activities harshly (by
increasing the sanctions on attempts or by expanding the scope of
attempts at the expense of preparation) or it can treat pre-crime
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activities leniently (by reducing the sanctions for attempts or by
expanding preparation at the expense of attempts).
Subsections a and b show that criminals who target overly
cautious victims are more sensitive to the sanctions that govern pre-
crime activities. Consequently, by modifying the sanctions for pre-
crime activities (either by modifying the sanctions for attempts, or by
modifying the boundaries between attempt and preparation) the law
influences discriminately the expected costs imposed upon criminals
who target highly cautious victims and those who target less cautious
victims. Reducing the sanctions for pre-crime activity leads to a
greater reduction of expected costs for criminals who target highly
cautious victims. This provides, in turn, global incentives for
potential victims to reduce their investments in precautions.
Finally, the law of pre-crime activities could, in a hypothetical
criminal law regime, provide local, rather than global, incentives to
reduce precautions. The law could treat pre-crime activities discrimi-
nately, according to the specific crime attempted or the specific
precautions applied by victims. For example, rather than discounting
penalties for attempts uniformly, the law could differentiate the
discounts in accordance with the particular offense. This approach
would have the same systematic effect on victims' behavior but would
offer greater flexibility in controlling specific types of investments in
precautions.
2. Extension: Differentiated Probability of Detection
One simplifying assumption made thus far is that the probability
of detection is independent of whether the criminal act succeeds.
The ensuing analysis takes a closer look at the role of the probability
of detection. Obviously, the probability of detecting and sanctioning
attempts may be different from the probability of detecting and
sanctioning completed crimes. For one, it may be that attempts are
harder to detect, either because they often go unnoticed, or because
the absence of physical harm reduces the readiness of victims and
witnesses to report the acts. Additionally, the prosecution may be
less likely to pursue a case without actual harm; a detected attempt
may thus end up unsanctioned. The opposite may also be true: if
a crime fails due to some precautionary measure, this same measure
may lead simultaneously to the detection of the criminal (e.g., alarm,
sirens). Or, a completed crime may eliminate the witness or the
evidence (as in the case of murder or fire), in which case it will be
easier to detect an attempt. Thus, we need to consider two possibili-
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ties: first, whether there is a lower probability of detecting attempts,
and then whether there is a higher probability of detecting attempts
compared to completed crimes.
a. Lower Probability of Detecting Attempts
To examine how the lower probability for detecting attempts
affects the incentives to target high- versus low-precaution victims, we
shall return to the numerical example presented above. Recall that
the sanction for a completed crime is 100, the sanction for an
attempt is S, the probability of success is .75 if targeting a low-
precaution victim, and .25 if targeting a high-precaution victim.
Assume now that the probability of detection depends on whether
the act succeeds. Specifically, the probability of detection continues
to be .4 if the criminal act fails and remains merely an attempt, but
it is higher-assumed to be .6-if the act succeeds. Under these
assumptions, the expected sanction for targeting a high-precaution
victim is:
(.25 x .6 x 100) + (.75 x .4 x S)
= 15 + (.3 x S),
and the expected sanction for targeting a low-precaution victim is:
(.75 x .6 x 100) + (.25 x .4 x S)
= 45 + (.1 x S).
Comparing the two expected sanction functions, one can
establish that the expected sanction for targeting high-precaution
victims is higher than the expected sanction for targeting low-
precaution victims whenever S < 150. Namely, at S = 100 (i.e., when
the sanction for attempt equals the sanction for completed act),
high-precaution victims involve a lower expected sanction and are
relatively more desirable targets. Recall that when we assumed that
the probabilities of detection were the same for attempts and
completed acts, the critical value of S (the value under which the
expected sanction becomes smaller for high-precaution victims) was
100, whereas now it is 150. This difference implies that the lower
probability of detecting attempts is itself a force that makes high-
precaution victims more attractive to criminals. With the greater
probability of failure, there is a smaller expected sanction.
Hence, even without differentiating the sanction for attempts
from completed crimes, there are already some incentives for
criminals to prefer high-precaution victims. As the sanction for
attempt becomes more lenient, these incentives are augmented. The
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lenient treatment of attempts operates on criminals' incentives in the
same direction as the lower probability of detecting attempts.
b. Higher Probability of Detecting Attempts
Assume now the opposite case, that attempts are more easily
detected than completed crimes. Specifically, assume in the above
example that attempts are detected with probability .4, whereas
compete crimes are detected with only .2 chance. Calculating the
criminals' expected sanction in a similar manner as above, we find
that the expected sanction for targeting a high-precaution victim is
5 + (.3 x S), and the expected sanction for targeting a low precaution
victim is 15 + (.1 x S).
Comparing the two functions, we can establish that whenever
S < 50, the expected sanction is higher when targeting a low-precau-
tion victim. But when S > 50, and in particular when 50 < S < 100,
that is, still less than the sanction for the completed act, the expected
sanction is higher when targeting a high-precaution victim. In
comparison to the case in which the probability of detection was the
same for attempts and completed acts (in which case it was sufficient
to set S < 100 to generate a higher expected sanction for high-
precaution victims) we now need to treat attempts even more
leniently in order to generate the criminal's preference toward high-
precaution victims. In fact, for any S at all, the relative desirability
of low-precaution victims is diminished. Thus, the higher probability
for detecting attempts is a consideration that makes high-precaution
victims less attractive to criminals: with the greater probability of
failure there is a higher probability of detection, and higher
expected sanction.
Hence, without differentiating the sanction for attempts from
completed crimes, criminals would strictly prefer low-precaution
victims: not only are they more likely to succeed with the act, but
they also benefit from a smaller probability of detection. Still,
lenient sanctions for attempt can reverse this trend. But now the
degree of leniency must be greater. The discount in the penalty for
attempts must be more significant if it is to make high-precaution
victims more desirable targets.
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3. The Efficiency of the Law of Pre-Crime Activities
This Article has argued that treating pre-crime activities leniently,
as most legal systems do, leads victims to reduce their investments in
precautions. Is this a desirable outcome?
In Part II, the distortions of victims' choices of precautions were
examined. The conclusion was ambiguous. Conflicting forces drive
victims to take either too many or too few precautions, and the
direction of the distortion cannot clearly be determined. Absent a
thorough empirical investigation, conjecture is speculative, based on
common sense and anecdotal evidence.
We believe that in a large set of situations, the dominant source
of distortion of victims' incentives is the diversion of crime, which
leads victims to take excessive precautions. Take property crimes for
example. Many types of victims' precautions, particularly those that
operate as protective measures to reduce the chances of harm to the
victims, merely divert crime to other scenes. If a victim builds a
fence around her house, the burglar will strike elsewhere; if a victim
installs a car antitheft device, the car thief will turn to another target;
if a victim carries only a small amount of money, the robber will rob
again in the hopes of recovering a larger amount. If a diversion of
crime is the result of victims' precautions, the level of precaution will
be socially excessive.9" Thus, inasmuch as precautionary activities
are observable to criminals, the concern exists that an overinvestment
in precautions will arise.9"
Similar reasoning applies to other types of offenses, including
violent crimes. If one victim's precautions merely transfer the crime
to another victim, there is no net social gain from these precautions,
and they ought to be discouraged. Similarly, f victims refrain from
various types of everyday activity in order to limit their exposure to
random crime, the amount of crime does not necessarily decrease,
and society bears the cost of this suppressed activity. Thus, precau-
tion against violent crime is another instance in which victims should
be driven to engage in a lesser degree of protection.
In support of these theoretical conjectures regarding the level of
precaution, one need only measure the size of annual spending on
precautionary measures in the United States. In a study looking at
9 See supra Part HA (discussing overinvestment in precautions).
9 Cf. Shavell, supra note 17, at 1232 (asserting that "because nonmonetary
sanctions are socially costly to impose, it is best for society to threaten to impose the
sanctions only where parties can probably successfully be deterred from acting
undesirably").
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the fiscal year 1985, economists estimated that victims' expenditures
made toward limiting physical access to their property was over $160
billion.9 8 Domestic security expenditures by the private sector
exceeded public military spending in that year.9 The high magni-
tude of these figures is alarming. It implies, we argue, that a social
problem of overinvestment in precautions exists. In light of this
problem, a global mechanism to reduce spending, such as the one
herein examined, gains merit. Hence, one may claim that it makes
economic sense to treat attempts leniently, thereby providing victims
with global incentives to reduce their overall levels of precaution.
4. Objections
a. The Limits of the Mechanism
We argue that treating pre-crime activities more leniently leads
criminals to target more cautious victims. Clearly, this does not
mean that criminals will exclusively target highly cautious victims. A
problem arises, however, in determining the effect on victims who
tend to take intermediate levels of precautions.100
To illustrate this problem, consider the following example.
Denote a rule that treats pre-crime activities leniently as "LR" and a
rule which treats pre-crime activities harshly, "HR." Assume that
there are three types of potential victims: type A victims who take
low levels of precaution, type B who take intermediate levels of
precaution, and type C victims who are highly cautious. Under the
HR regime, some criminals target A, some target B, and some target
C. What happens if we move to the LR regime? Because of the
lower expected sanctions, some of the criminals previously targeting
type A victims will shift to type B victims or to type C victims, and
some of the criminals targeting type B victims will shift to type C
victims. It is unclear whether type B victims will be worse off under
LR than under HR. Thus, we cannot determine in the abstract how
11 See Laband & Sophocleus, supra note 5, at 962-63. This study estimated the total
expenditures on transfer activities (including government enforcement, insurance,
and litigation) to be in excess of $400 billion. See id. at 962. The victims' precautions
category, which totalled more than $160 billion, includes the estimated cost of locks,
alarms and guards for both residences and businesses. See id. at 962-63; see also
Philipson & Posner, supra note 5, at 406-07 (listing common precautions taken by
potential victims).
9 See Laband & Sophocleus, supra note 5, at 965 (reporting military expenditures
of approximately $226 billion in 1985).
1' We are grateful to Mike Otsuka for this argument.
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the rule will affect the victims taking intermediate levels of precau-
tion.
This analytical shortcoming of the proposed approach does not,
however, lead to the unravelling of the incentive mechanism. One
should keep in mind that the social objective is not necessarily to
monitor each victim's actions perfectly, but to implement more
efficient macro levels of precautions. A successful regime is one that
will lead to an overall reduction in spending on precautions, even if
some victims are not affected (or adversely affected) by the general
trend. Thus, even if type B victims do not reduce their still excessive
precautions, the LR regime may be desirable given its overall effect.
b. Is Criminal Law the Proper Tool?
Under the victim-centered perspective, criminal law can be
designed to affect the incentives operating upon victims in their
decisions to take precautions against crime. Thus, the addressees of
criminal law injunctions are, under this analysis, not merely potential
criminals, but also potential victims. This approach expands both
the range of individuals who are depicted as the addressees of
criminal law injunctions, as well as the set of activities the criminal
law aims to influence.
This expansion raises difficult questions concerning the proper
role and boundaries of criminal law. If criminal law can be used to
provide potential victims with incentives to take precautions, why can
it not be used in the same manner to provide incentives for potential
victims to be good citizens in other sectors of life? Can one induce
individuals to contribute to charity or to pay their debts or alimony
on time by manipulating the criminal sanctions that are imposed for
crimes committed against these individuals? If such a proposal seems
pernicious, why is it legitimate to use the criminal law to induce
potential victims to take efficient precautions against crime?
Specifically, which categories of behavior should society induce on
the part of potential victims through the mechanism of differen-
tiating the sanctions imposed upon crimes directed against these
victims?
Admittedly, the logic of this Article's approach fits any kind of
victim behavior. But this "mechanical" conformity does not present
the whole picture. There are other factors that ought to determine
when an applicable incentive mechanism should be utilized.
Specifically, it may be legitimate to use differentiated sanctions to
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monitor victims',precautions, while it may be illegitimate to use it to
monitor other types of non-virtuous behavior.
A full exploration of the role and boundaries of the criminal law,
and of the behavior it can legitimately induce, is beyond the scope
of this Article. Let us, however, provide several reasons that support
the claim that inducing individuals to take efficient precautions is
within the sphere of legitimate criminal law application.
First, by regulating the behavior of potential victims, criminal law
does what other areas of law have long been expected to do.0'1
Contract law, through doctrines of reliance and mitigation, issues
directives to the victims of breached contracts as well as to those who
have committed breaches.0 2 Similarly, tort law, through contribu-
tory negligence doctrines, induces action not only by potential
tortfeasors, but also by the victims of torts."0 ' Criminal law, on the
other hand, is ordinarily regarded as an exception in this respect, but
only because its rhetoric presupposes an exclusively perpetrator-based
perspective.
Second, there seems to be an inherent difference between an
investment in precautions and other activities undertaken by victims.
This difference suggests that the only type of victim behavior the
criminal law can effectively induce through the mechanisms analyzed
above is an investment in precautions. Criminal law can induce
potential victims to take efficient precautions because of its influence
101 See Cooter, supra note 3, at 3-29 (discussing how the law encourages precautions
in torts, contracts, and property).
"0 For a discussion of various types of victims' incentives, see id. at 44 (suggesting
a symmetry between the roles of injurers and victims in preventing losses). On
victims' incentives to make reliance investments, see Steven Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contrac4 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 467-72 (1980) (discussing the use of
damage measures to influence the behavior of parties who have entered into a
contractual relationship); William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures
for Breach of Contrac 15 RAND J. ECON. 89 (1984) (extending Shavell's analysis to
focus strictly on reliance decisions); Steven Shavell, TheDesign of Contracts and Remedies
for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121 (1984) (asserting that contingent contract terms,
remedies for breach, and renegotiation all "induce parties to behave approximately
as they would under detailed contracts"). On victims' incentives to reveal informa-
tion, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989) (discussing the use of penalty defaults to induce potential breach victims
to contract around default provisions); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284, 285 (1991) (arguing that efficient default rules
should mimic the parties' will, or make the option of opting-out cheap).
103 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-32 (1987)
(discussing a model for liability and deterrence that includes both injurers and
victims).
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on criminals and its ability to induce criminals to select certain
victims over others. Such an influence depends upon the access
criminals have to the information concerning the relevant behavior
of potential victims. Thus, if the legislature wishes to induce certain
behaviors on the part of potential victims by differentiating the
sanctions imposed upon criminals in accordance with the behavior
of their victims, it can do so effectively only if criminals have
information concerning the behavior of the victims. But while it is
likely that, during their pre-crime activities, criminals obtain
information concerning the precautions taken by their victims, it is
less likely that they will have information concerning their victim's
other virtues or vices. A criminal can observe whether his victim
installed locks and alarms, but not whether his victim paid her school
loans promptly, contributed to charity, or treated her neighbors
respectfully.
Nevertheless, one has to concede that even if criminals could
observe whether their victims paid debts or contributed to charity, it
may be unjustifiable to differentiate the sanctions imposed upon
criminals on the basis of such behavior by victims. Victims' invest-
ment in precautions against crime is a natural component of the
social costs of crime and, thus, it is naturally a normative target for
criminal law. Put differently, both precautions and sanctions are
aimed at deterring crime and, thus, designing a scheme that
conditions one on the other seems a natural method for implement-
ing optimal deterrence.
c. Criminal Law Versus Fiscal Policy
Even if it is morally legitimate to use the criminal law to provide
incentives for potential victims to invest efficiently in precautions,
such incentives could also be provided through other fiscal measures,
such as taxation and subsidization of precautionary activity.
104
Should society use direct fiscal measures or should it use the criminal
law to influence victims' behavior?
A full comparison of the advantages of these two implementation
methods is beyond the scope of this Article. 05 It may be that
104 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6, at 444 (discussing the use of alternative
methods to induce victims to invest in the optimal level of private enforcement). We
are grateful to Scott Altman and Eric Talley for discussion of this issue.
105 Some general analytical guidelines are provided in Steven Shavell, The Optimal
Structure of Law Enforcement 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 257-61 (1993) (comparing the
principal dimensions of law enforcement including tort law, criminal law and safety
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taxing or subsidizing precautions may, under certain circumstances,
be superior. It is worthwhile, however, to specify at least one
advantage of the system proposed here over direct tax or subsidy.
Many of the precautions used by potential victims are simply not
taxable. A decision to go or not to go to the cinema, to walk or not
to walk in the park, to provoke or not to provoke a potential
aggressor, or to lock or not to lock one's car is not the type of
decision that can easily be controlled through taxation. Hence,
using taxes or subsidies are practical means to guarantee efficient
investment in precautions only when precautions are a quantifiable
consumption product, that is, traded in a market. Since many of the
precautions used by potential victims cannot be taxed, the criminal
law mechanism that this Article examines becomes necessary as a
means of control.
CONCLUSION
This Article develops two main themes, one positive and one
normative. Under the positive theme, the manner in which pre-
crime activities are treated in the criminal law influences the way
criminals select their victims. Consequently, it influences the
investment of potential victims in precautions. This positive theme
was derived under standard economic assumptions, that is, the
assumptions of rationality and foresight on the part of perpetrators
and potential victims of crime.
The understanding of the positive theme can help construct
various normative arguments. The main normative theme advanced
by this Article is that the lenient treatment of pre-crime activities
promotes efficiency because it leads to an overall reduction of the
investment of potential victims in precautions. This claim depends,
however, upon the conjecture that, in the absence of special
treatment of pre-crime activities, potential victims will overinvest in
precautions. The diversity of conflicting factors that distorts victims'
investments in precautions makes the normative claim more
speculative. The law of pre-crime activities could be justified on
efficiency grounds only if the distortions that motivate victims to
overinvest are more powerful than the distortions that motivate
victims to underinvest. However, other normative themes may rise
from the analysis. The treatment of pre-crime activities can become
an instrument to effectuate victims' behavior, no matter what the
regulations).
ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
underlying objective. A society that wishes to control and monitor
the way in which victims behave for reasons outside the scope of
efficiency is now equipped with one more weapon in its arsenal.
The victim-centered perspective that this Article advances can be
extended in various directions. One theme for future research could
be the comparison of the theoretical framework with an empirical
verification. By comparing the different observed patterns of
behavior of potential victims across jurisdictions that treat pre-crime
activities differently, one could verify (or refute) the positive
predictions of this Article. Or, alternatively, by examining the
changes in the patterns of behavior of potential victims resulting
from changes in the legal treatment of pre-crime activities, one could
provide an empirical test for the theoretical predictions.
Another theme for possible extension is to apply the victim-
centered approach to other areas of criminal law. Are there
common practices which are ordinarily justified with respect to their
effect on criminals, and which can now be understood with respect
to their effect on victims? Lastly, the victim-centered perspective can
be extended within its theoretical apparatus if examined under less
restrictive informational assumptions. One may inquire, for example,
whether victims can be induced to take optimal precautionary
measures even when these measures are not readily observable by
criminals or courts.
One cannot conclude without the standard proviso that charac-
terizes economic analysis of law. This Article proposes an insight,
not a reform. It seeks to understand the effects of different legal
regimes, not to design a new one. The reader may elect to reject the
normative premise underlying the analysis, as well as its moral
implications. In such a case, the Article contributes an understand-
ing of the price of these moral considerations. If society is reluctant
to use the criminal law as a means of influencing the behavior of
potential victims, it needs to be informed of some important, yet less
obvious, ensuing costs.
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